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Abstract: Modern theories of famine largely concur that famine is
not the simple consequence of a lack of food. Today, studies con-
firm that global food supplies are adequate to cure hunger and pre-
sumably, to provide sufficient relief in cases of famine. Yet famines
persist for long periods and on large scales. The recent North Ko-
rean famine of 1995-98 took the lives of approximately one million
people and inflicted incalculable amounts of suffering on its vic-
tims. Even if viewed solely in terms of its demographic impact, the
famine can be easily characterized as disastrous. But a more compre-
hensive examination of the phenomenon reveals a far more disturbing
possibility: the North Korean government, under the harsh rule of
Kim Jong Il, made either short-sighted or deliberate policy choices
that caused and/or perpetuated famine conditions. There is consider-
able evidence that a good portion of international food aid failed to
reach the intended beneficiaries because the government improperly
diverted relief to black markets or to politically favored segments
of the population. These acts of subversion have caused scholars
and international aid organizations to reconsider whether continu-
ing such aid is appropriate. This paper undertakes that inquiry in the
hopes of providing a realistic and pragmatic assessment of the North
Korean relief efforts.
1I. Introduction
Famine is certainly not a new phenomenon,1 and for most people, it is not diﬃcult to understand what is
meant by the term “famine.” Perhaps most simply and commonly, the idea of prolonged starvation comes
to mind. While this observation is not incorrect, it is incomplete. There is an extensive literature simply
on the deﬁnition of famine, the goal of which is to provide a more complete understanding of what factors
characterize this unfortunate phenomenon. 2 Although there is no one precise deﬁnition that emerges
from these sources, the various deﬁnitions paint a similar picture. According to one scholar, famine is a
“widespread [and/]or extreme” food shortage accompanied by “human mortality from starvation.”3 Another
scholar deﬁnes famine as “a prolonged total shortage of foods, in a limited geographic area, and leads to
widespread disease and death from starvation.”4 And the World Food Programme (WFP) deﬁnes it as “the
incidence of serious food shortage across a country that dangerously aﬀects the nutrition levels, health and
1Recent famines include the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, the Bengali famine of 1943 (2 million deaths), the Chinese famine
of 1958-62 (30 million deaths), the Bangledeshi famine of 1974 (1.5 million dead), and the Cambodian famine in the late
1970s (unknown casualties). Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine 7 (2001). For more information on
these famines and still others, see Article 19, Starving in Silence: A Report on Famine and Censorship 17-138 (1990)
(discussing the Chinese and East African famines); Arline T. Golkin, Famine: A Heritage of Hunger – A Guide to Issues
and References xi-xiii (1987) (providing a chronology of famines from Egypt in 3500 B.C. to East Africa in 1948-86); id.
at 51-101 (discussing nineteenth and twentieth century famines in further detail); Lillian M. Li, Feeding China’s One Billion:
Perspectives from History, in Famine 28, 28-38 (Kevin M. Cahill ed., 1982); Kevin M. Cahill, The Clinical Face of Famine in
Somalia, in Famine, supra, at 39, 39-43; Fraces D’Souza, Famine: Social Security and an Analysis of Vulnerability, in Famine
1, 11-47 (G.A. Harrison ed., 1988) (providing case studies of the famines in Lesotho, Mozambique, and Ethiopia); Martin
Ravallion, Markets and Famines 57-101 (1987) (discussing the economics of rice markets during the Bangladesh famine).
2The deﬁnitions provided in the text represent only a very small sampling of the academic discussions on the deﬁnition of
famine. See also, e.g., David Arnold, Famine: Social Crisis and Historical Change 7 (1988) (“If hunger can be likened
to disease, famine constitutes its epidemic rather than endemic state, the multiplication of existing conditions of inequality,
poverty and malnutrition into a crisis of massive proportions.”); William J. Byron, Whose Right to Food?, in Famine (Kevin
M. Cahill ed.), supra note 1, at 63, 63 (adopting the deﬁnition of famine as being “a protracted total shortage of food in a
restricted geographic area, causing widespread disease and death from starvation” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
William A. Dando, Six Millennia of Famine: Map and Model, 8 Proceedings of the Ass’n of Am. Geographers 20 (1976)));
D’Souza, supra note 1, at 7 (“[F]amine can be deﬁned as a reduction in normally available food supply such that individuals,
families, and eventually whole communities are forced to take up abnormal social and economic activities in order to ensure
food.”); Laurie DeRose, Ellen Messer, & Sara Millman, Who’s Hungry? And How Do We Know?: Food Shortage,
Poverty, and Deprivation 2 (1998) (describing famine as a condition “in which widespread severe food shortage had led to
elevated mortality and mass movements of populations in search of food”).
3G.B. Masefield, Famine: Its Prevention and Relief 3-4 (1963).
4Introduction to Famine (Kevin M. Cahill ed.), supra note 1, at 1.
2livelihood of many people, to the extent that there is a large incidence of acute malnutrition and many people
have died of hunger.”5 In short, famine is much more than starvation6 – its nature is far more disastrous
and its consequences more far-reaching.7
An interesting aspect of famine that is not apparent from the deﬁnitions is the disparate extents to which
the relevant region is impacted. Although famine “involves fairly widespread acute starvation, there is no
reason to think that it will aﬀect all groups in the famine-aﬀected nation.”8 As astutely highlighted by
famine expert Amartya Sen,
it is by no means clear that there has ever occurred a famine in which all groups
in a country have suﬀered from starvation, since diﬀerent groups typically do have
very diﬀerent commanding powers over food, and an over-all shortage brings out
the contrasting powers in stark clarity.
....
The importance of inter-group distributional issues rests not mere in the fact that
an over-all shortage may be very unequally shared by diﬀerent groups, but also in
the recognition that some groups can suﬀer acute absolute deprivation even when
there is no over-all shortage.9
Sen makes a number of important points in this passage, but perhaps most interestingly, he strongly suggests
5Amnesty Int’l, Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (North Korea) 2 (2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa240032004 (quoting the WFP
deﬁnition).
6See Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation 39 (1981). Famines encompass
starvation but starvation does not necessarily result in famine. Author Bernard Shaw presents an alternative distinction between
starvation and famine in the following dialogue between two Irish American characters:
Malone: Me father died of starvation in the black 47. Maybe you’ve heard of it?
Violet: The Famine?
Malone: No, the starvation. When a country is full o food and exporting it, there can be no famine. Me father was starved
dead; and I was starved out to American in me mother’s arms.
G. Bernard Shaw, Man and Superman 196 (Penguin 1946), quoted in Sen, supra, at 40. Shaw essentially makes the point
that famine cannot exist when there are suﬃcient resources to feed the population and thereby suggests that the Irish famine
was a deliberate policy choice made by the government. This implication ought to be kept in mind when considering the cause
of the North Korean famine, as discussed in section III.B.3.
7 See Introduction, to Famine (Kevin M. Cahill ed.), supra note 1, at 1 (“Though blood may ﬂow in both, there is a
clear diﬀerence between a minor laceration and a hemorrhage. So too we must not confuse undernutrition or even hunger with
famine. Famine is of a diﬀerent scale....”).
8 Sen, supra note 6, at 43 (emphasis added).
3an economic and political dimension to famine. The fact that certain individuals are more privy to famine
while other individuals in the same geography are less so, makes clear that famine may not merely be about
the absence of food, but more likely about the access to food. This observation lends to another suggestion
(though Sen may not have intended to make this further point): there is an ethical dimension to famine
as well. If disparities in an individual’s access to food are permitted or tolerated for so long that a famine
results, then the absence of intervention by the government or any other interested organization may indicate
a moral failure to address basic human needs.
These preliminary observations about the economic, political, and moral dimensions of famine ﬁt easily
under Sen’s “entitlement approach,” an inﬂuential theory that has shaped much of famine scholarship. The
entitlement approach challenges the traditional theory of famine, or the theory of food availability decline
(FAD), and posits a new paradigm from which to understand the occurrence of famine. The theory of
FAD purports that famines are the simple consequence of a shortage of food.10 The entitlement approach
rejects that causation and views famine as a more dynamic phenomenon, that is, as “a relation between
people and food in terms of a network of entitlement relations.”11 Under this view, famine is about the
inability of “diﬀerent sections of the population to establish command over food, using entitlement relations
operating in that society depending on its legal, economic, political, and social characteristics.”12 Because
famine is essentially the result of a systematic collapse of entitlement mechanisms in a particular region, this
means that famine can erupt without a decline in food production. While the entitlement approach does not
discount food shortages as a possible cause of famine, it criticizes any theory that considers this one factor
a suﬃcient or even necessary condition for famine.13
10Id. at 154; cf. DeRose, Messer & Millman, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that famine is usually viewed as “a production
failure”).
11Sen, supra note 6, at 159.
12Id. at 162; see id. at 45.
13In other words, the FAD theory does not provoke the questions necessary to acquire a more robust understanding of famine:
A food-centered view tells us rather little about starvation. It does not tell us how starvation can develop even without a
decline in food availability. Nor does it tell us – even when starvation is accompanied by a fall in food supply – why some
4Contemporary theories of famine concur with the basic idea underlying the entitlement approach, and they
acknowledge that their occurrence is not simply the result of an organic cause, such as a lack of resources
owing to a natural disaster.14 Without disputing the variety of possible factors relevant to the onset of
famine, modern accounts converge when it comes to identifying a particularly troubling root of famine:
[I]n the contemporary world, the sources of food insecurity increasingly can be
traced not to natural causes but to human ones. Today there is no reason for
anyone to starve as a result of weather conditions, food shortages, or even failures
in distribution. Global food supplies are adequate.
....
... With eﬀective institutions and adequate physical supplies, the occurrence of
famine increasingly signals not the lack of food or capacity, but some fundamen-
tal political or governance failure. Natural conditions are no longer our primary
adversaries: humans are.15
This assessment is a sobering one, as it preempts blame-shifting with its clear pronouncement that famine
is a human choice. In entitlement-approach terms, famine suggests that policymakers and legislatures have
constructed legal rights in a way so as to obstruct access to food irrespective of availability. Whether such
policies or laws are pursued intentionally or unintentionally, culpability remains on the shoulders of society.
Consider the troubling implications through a very simpliﬁed micro-example: Country X needs at least 1,000
tons of grain each year to meet all of its citizens’ minimum nutritional needs. Under ordinary circumstances,
X’s grain production levels exceed 5,000 tons (leaving an excess of 4,000 tons). X is the only exporter
groups had to starve while others could feed themselves. The over-all food picture is too remote an economic variable to tell
us much about starvation.... If some people had to starve, then clearly, they didn’t have enough food, but the question is: why
didn’t they have food? What allows one group rather than another to get hold of the food that is there?
Id. note 6, at 154.
14See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that a famine’s “proximate cause” may be “natural disasters” or “‘man-made’
calamity like civil war” but that these are “often no more than the precipitating factors, intensifying or bringing to the fore a
society’s inner contradictions and inherent weaknesses” (emphasis added)); id. at 29-42 (discussing some of the more traditional
theories of famine causation); Byron, supra note 2, at 63 (“The notion that famines are man-made is not new.”); D’Souza,
supra note 1, at 7 (“It is now fairly generally accepted that famine is rarely, if ever, the result of absolute food shortages but
due rather to the unequal distribution of available food.”).
5of grain, as all other countries suﬀer from domestic shortfalls. Due to a recent hurricane, production fell
drastically to 500 tons and full agricultural rehabilitation is not expected for at least another ﬁve years.
These are the circumstances that accord with the FAD theory: the cause of famine here is the shortage in
food supplies, or more speciﬁcally, an overall shortage in grain and total unavailability of import resources.
The scenario painted is an unlikely one – in fact, it is descriptively inaccurate since research indicates an
adequate supply of food. Consider an amendment to the hypothetical, noting the way just one variable can
complicate the issue: X has stored at least 100,000 tons in grain reserves in the event of such a catastrophe.
This means that X does not need external assistance, if available, for at least ten years. But how should
the government allocate these resources: equitably among all of its citizens, proportionate to an individual’s
height and weight, or through a policy of ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served? Moreover, should X attempt to meet its
preexisting export obligations, since other countries are depend on their resources to meet their own nutri-
tional minima? If so, should its obligation be met in full or only a certain percentage? What considerations
would be relevant for determining its domestic and/or foreign distribution policy? And to what extent?
Or consider what would happen if Country Y experiences an “agricultural revolution” at the same time
as X’s hurricane, raising its yearly domestic production to 5,000 tons. This means, at least theoretically,
that Y displaces X as the central exporter of grain. But does Y have the same obligation to meet X’s
previous export obligation? If the surplus is not enough to compensate for X’s decrease in output, since X
produced at least 5,000 tons per year before the hurricane, how would Y determine which countries receives
aid? Would the establishment of a market appear too capitalistic a response in the face of potential famine?
Or would it be the only orderly way of controlling distribution among a number of clamoring countries?
Furthermore, would Y have a legal or ethical obligation to provide relief to X, which previously imported its
surplus during Y’s “lean seasons”? If so, how would compliance be enforced? Under what conditions would
6it be fair to decrease or halt relief? Should relief ﬂow indiscriminately or should contingencies be built in as
external monitoring mechanisms?
The number of issues that must be resolved increase dramatically when even a few simple considerations are
added to the picture. The latter two versions of the hypothetical, which more aptly simplify the present reality
among countries with respect to food resources, raise much more complicated questions. Both situations
arise where there is a suﬃcient supply (at least temporarily) but also where a fair theory of distribution
and relief is not easy to construct. Today, that theory remains unclear. Whatever idea of entitlement we
currently possess, it involves the persistent hunger of certain populations. But if the cause of famine is really
a matter of human choice and policymaking, then there is an upside to this attribution. Hurricanes, ﬂoods,
and other natural disasters are uncontrollable environmental forces. On the other hand, errors in entitlement
constructs are reparable. Simply, it means there is something that can be done – and hopefully, something
that will be done – irregardless of the complexity of issues.
The recent North Korean famine presents a formidable array of such complications. North Korea experienced
a devastating famine in the mid- to late-1990s that resulted in the death and the mental as well as nutritional
injury of several million peoples. When Eri Kudo, a WFP relief worker, asked one woman during a family
visit to look into her kitchen, he found a sad but telling picture of the severe impact of the famine on the
North Korean citizens: “[The] woman had only a large rice bowl containing a watery porridge of rice and
grated corn – mainly water. [This] was for her entire family – three bowls of that porridge for the day for
ﬁve family members.”16 This snapshot may still represent everyday life for some North Koreans, as even a
decade of generous aid has not lifted the country from need. Approximately 40,000 North Korean children
16Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty 553
(2004).
7die from malnutrition and other nutrition-related diseases every year.17 Others risk imprisonment, political
ostracism, and even their lives in a simple search for food.
Given these circumstances, humanitarian aspirations to relieve such suﬀering seem at least normatively
attractive, if not necessary. But unfortunately, the situation is more murky in the context of North Korea.
Known as the most closed, secretive, and according to some, brutal regime in the world today, many questions
surround the North Korean famine. Because of accusations that the famine was a direct policy choice by the
North Korean government and that the international relief resources are primarily invested into its military
at the cost of “agricultural production, industrial output, exports, trade, and political relations,”18 there are
many who now doubt whether relief ought to be provided at all. And those who advocate continuing relief
naturally wonder what type of conditions ought to be imposed in order to ensure distribution that accords
with donors’ intentions.
Because of these complications, the intellectual task of determining the cause and proper response to famine
in the context of North Korea is most challenging. This paper attempts to reexamine the North Korean
famine, turning a keen eye toward the various policy issues raised by the recent crisis in the hopes of providing
a balanced and pragmatic approach to handling the sensitive issues that are involved. It also recognizes the
signiﬁcance of developing a more sophisticated response to the crisis given the national as well as international
implications raised:
17Jae-Young Kim, North Korea’s Children Are Starving, The Dong-A Ilbo, Feb. 8, 2006,
http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=040000&biid=2006020822199.
18Sue Lautze, The Famine in North Korea: Humanitarian Responses in Communist Nations, Fe-
instein Int’l Famine Ctr. *4 (Feinstein Int’l Famine Ctr., Working Paper, June 1997), available at
http://nutrition.tufts.edu/pdf/research/famine/nkorea.pdf.
8First, for purely humanitarian reasons it is important to better understand the
long-term nature of food problems in North Korea. Is the recent demand for aid
expected to be a regular occurrence? Second, for the world grain trade, it is useful
to know if North Korea is likely to become a regular customer through foreign aid
or commercial sales. Finally, North Korea may be vulnerable to political instability
or even military action prompted in part by food shortages. If such shortages
are chronic, then without policy restructuring, North Korea may be the source of
substantial security concerns for the region, and indeed for the world.19
Moreover, the North Korean famine ought to be looked at because the question of famine relief itself raises
provocative issues of “how to balance moral values against political, diplomatic, and geostrategic interests.”20
There are real tradeoﬀs between choosing realist or idealist strategies, such that policymakers, government
oﬃcials, and even laymen ought to reconsider the humanitarian eﬀort in North Korea: “What may seem
to be the most economically or politically expedient policy... may turn out to be a singularly ineﬀective
or counterproductive way of pursuing national interests. And what may seem to be the correct moral
course may in fact lead one into deeper and darker moral dilemmas while achieving little or nothing of
substance.”21 The truth of the matter may be that doing “good” without a careful analysis of the multiple,
cross-cutting interests may result in further “bad.” This paper endeavors to provide a fresh perspective on
the North Korean famine, in the hopes that a critical reconsideration of the problem would promote the
most thoughtful use of resources.
II. Country Proﬁle
A. A Brief History
20Natsios, supra note 1, at xi.
21Id. at x.
9Some may consider the long history of North Korea as tragic22 – and such sentiment would not be without
good reason. At the same time, it is hard to dispute that this same history is compelling, even remarkable.
Despite the end of the Cold War and fall of Communism, North Korea and its seemingly anachronistic
form of government remains intact. While “nationalist Stalinist” regimes collapsed, the Kims’ “Communist
monarchy” survived.23 Although it is impossible to recount all of the historical details here, “it is diﬃcult
(indeed, impossible) to understand [North Korea’s] present without knowledge of its past.”24 Therefore,
the history recounted below should not merely be absorbed as interesting background material but also as
a critical insight into the inner workings and mentality of a truly unique regime. Because much of North
Korea’s current existence has been shaped by its past, policymakers, whether for food or other humanitarian
relief eﬀorts, must maintain a precise yet sensitive awareness of this distinct history.
1. The Birth of North Korea. – With the end of World War II and Japan’s formal surrender in August
1945, the Korean peninsula was immediately separated into two zones, divided by the 38th parallel; the
United States occupied the south and the Soviet Union the north.25 This division was originally created as
a temporary solution until a formal trusteeship among the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union,
and China could be established.26 Such an arrangement, however, was never reached; the countries failed to
22See, e.g., Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kil Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960, at vii (2002)
(characterizing North Korean history as “a story of spectacular failure”).
23Id. at 196. Explanations as to North Korea’s resilience vary. See, e.g., id. at 196-97 (“The experience of North Korea
demonstrates that... the Stalinist regimes can be very tenacious if they succeed in cutting their populace oﬀ from outside
inﬂuences, are ready to resist foreign pressures stubbornly, and refuse to reform themselves whatever hardships such a decisions
imposes on the populace.”).
24Id. at xiii.
25U.S. Dep’t. of State, Bureau of East Asian and Paciﬁc Aﬀairs, Background Note: North Korea (Nov. 2005),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm.
26There are those who blame the Soviet Union and the United States for the present division of the Korean peninsula,
attributing fault on these foreign nations for imposing their belligerence on a third-party nation. See, e.g., Lankov, supra note
10agree or compromise on the issue of establishing a national government.27 As a result, “two separate nations
with diametrically opposed political, economic, and social systems” were born.28
On August 15, 1945, only six days after entering World War II, the Soviet Union occupied what is now North
Korea, ousting Japanese colonialists.29 It was not long after that the Soviet Union began its “sovietisation”
or “communisation” of this new territory.30 Part of the initiative included conscripting Soviet Koreans to
Pyongyang, the headquarters of the Soviet army charged with the North’s occupation.31 One of these arrivals
was Kim Il Sung,32 then a captain in the Soviet army and a former anti-Japanese guerilla commander.33
Regarded as “young, energetic” as well as loyal to Soviet interests, Soviet authorities eventually decided on
Kim Il Sung as the future leader of North Korea when attempts to cooperate with existing local authorities
appeared more and more unworkable.34 Kim Il Sung’s ascendancy to power was formalized with a rally in
his honor35 and with the formation of the North Korean Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea, which
was established as a part of the overall Soviet eﬀort to maintain oversight over those territories under its
Communist control.36 After some political restructuring, including the conversion of the Bureau into the
22, at 7-8.
27The question was submitted to the UN General Assembly, but the rapid changes in the countries’ domestic and foreign
policies aﬃrmed that any trusteeship arrangement would no longer be impossible. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 25.
28Id. The Republic of Korea, or South Korea as more commonly known, was created on August 15, 1948 with the election
of Syngman Rhee as the ﬁrst president. Id.
29See Lankov, supra note 22, at 1. Of course, Korean history predates the mid-twentieth century by thousands of years. For
a capsule of relevant events during the earlier part of its existence, see U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 25.
30Lankov, supra note 22, at 7 & n.12. Or, more precisely, this process of creating a pro-Soviet government was called
“sovietisation of the liberated territories.” Id.
31Id. at 5, 16-17.
32Kim Il Sung’s arrival into North Korea was timely though by no means arranged. Some commentators therefore describe
his rise to leadership as almost accidental. See id. at 17-18, 59 (“Had he arrived in Pyongyang a few weeks later or been sent
to another large city, his fate would have been diﬀerent.”).
33Id. at 17.
34Id. at 17-18.
35During the public rally, Kim Il Sung – true to propagandist form – recited a speech written by the political department
of the Soviet army. It is reported that parts of the speech were actually incomprehensible because the speech was originally
written in Russian and then awkwardly translated into Korean. Oﬃcials also heralded the new leader as a “national hero”
and “outstanding guerrilla leader.” The attendees, however, either had no idea of who Kim Il Sung was or doubted such
characterizations. See id. at 19.
36Id. at 20. Interestingly, and contrary to the North Korean historiography asserting Kim Il Sung’s exclusive leadership, the
ﬁrst leader of the Bureau was Kim Yong Bom. Kim Yong Bom, however, was soon replaced, oﬃcially placing Kim Il Sung as
the leader of the North Korean Communists. Id. at 21-22.
11Central Committee of the North Korean Communist Party (formed in the spring of 1946),37 the North
Korean Workers’ Party arose as the oﬃcial party by late August 1946.38 Through a series of speedy but
comprehensive reforms, from the formation of land redistribution plans to its own army, “[f]or all practical
purposes, by the end of 1947 a separate state had emerged.”39 Following the unanimous approval of the
Constitution, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was oﬃcially born on September 9, 1948.40
2. The Era of Kim Il Sung. – Kim Il Sung took power from the day of North Korea’s birth and held onto
his reign for the next forty-nine years – a remarkably long term of oﬃce for any world leader.41 Throughout
his dictatorship, Kim Il Sung exerted incredible inﬂuence over North Korea.42 His profound inﬂuence is
illustrated in part by the fact that he sits posthumously as the “Eternal President” of the government by
constitutional mandate.43
Although Kim Il Sung lacked formal education, he proved to be a “shrewd and highly ambitious politician,”
37Id. at 28.
38Id. at 31.
39See id. at 32-41. Kim Il Sung did not rise to power and the form of government did not establish itself without some
resistance; one salient example of opposition includes an unsuccessful assassination attempt. See id. at 22-26.
40Id. at 47.
41Id. at 49. The fact that Kim Il Sung’s was able to rule over North Korea for such a long period of time and sustain a regime
that outsiders characterize as oppressive, is not to be casually disregarded as the product of chance or fortuity. Certainly, a
number of factors may account for his dominance, but “[e]ven the most consistent adherent of historical determinism would
hardly disagree that the personality of a leader leaves some impact on a country’s fate.” Id.; see also Martin, supra note 17, at
x (“The North Korean changes, not likely to be reversed quickly or easily, were largely the work of two men: Kim Il-sung and his
son Kim Jong-il... .”). Though this particular discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, there are interesting arguments to
be constructed, using information about Kim Il Sung’s upbringing and experiences that may explain how a seemingly “normal”
man was able to capture the minds of an entire citizenry for nearly half a century. For biographical information on Kim Il
Sung, see Martin, supra note 17, at 49-76. But as with almost all research on North Korea, readers should be aware that even
biographical information is not entirely veriﬁable or accurate, given not only a lack of access to information, but also the fact
that his biography was reconstructed to be “politically more appropriate” when he came to power. Id. at 49-50.
42See Lankov, supra note 22, at 49.
43Dae-Kyu Yoon, The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1289, 1301 (2004).
The 1998 revisions to the North Korean constitution oﬃcially appointed Kim Il Sung to this post-humus position.
12“a master of political intrigue,” and a “skilled tactician.” He possessed “remarkable skill in manoeuvring [sic]
and an uncanny ability to exploit contradictions between his enemies, as well as his friends.”44 By the early
1960s, after deﬂating several domestic and foreign policy threats,45 Kim Il Sung became “not only supreme,
but also the omnipotent ruler of North Korea – no longer merely ‘ﬁrst among equals.”’46 He became the
“Great Leader, the Sun of the Nation, the Marshal of the Mighty Republic.”47 And North Koreans did
not merely look to Kim Il Sung as a ﬁgure of political prominence, but they also regarded him with great
personal aﬃnity. First-hand reports recount citizens sincerely characterizing Kim Il Sung as their loving and
caring father.
As Kim Il Sung earned god-like status among the people (and as Soviet control gradually weakened over
the country), he became better positioned to institute and indoctrinate his vision of government and society
for North Korea. Kim Il Sung was originally inspired by the Marxist-Leninist ideal of socialism, which
characterized the law as a means of establishing a proletariat dictatorship.48 He expressed these type of
views in a public address before legal workers in 1958, stating that “the law... is an important weapon for
implementing the policies of [the] State” and that “law must be subordinated to policies and must not be
divorced from them.”49 Thus, he made clear that what would shape North Korean government was oﬃcial
policy rather than law. In practical terms, this meant Kim Il Sung himself would dictate and control every
aspect of North Korean government and society since oﬃcial policy was essentially his construct and there
were no democratic checks to promote any form of accountability. Kim Il Sung also preempted potential
44Lankov, supra note 22, at 62.
45For examples of these domestic and foreign policy issues and a lengthier treatment of Kim Il Sung’s political ingenuity
during these situations, see id. at 62-71, 77-135.
46Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added).
47Id. at 49.
48Patricia Goedde, Essay, Law “Of Our Own Style”: The Evolution and Challenges of the North Korean Legal System, 27
Fordham Int’l L.J. 1265, 1270-71 (2004).
49Id. at 1271-72 (quoting Sung Yoon Cho, The Judicial System of North Korea, 11(2) Asian Survey 1171, 1180 (Dec. 1971)
(quoting Kim Il Sung, 1 Selected Works 384)). Kim Il Sung’s understanding of the law and its purpose explains why the
current regime still subsumes the role of law and the North Korean Constitution under party directives. See infra section
II.B.1.(b).
13dissension toward his theory of government by executing Stalinist-type purges to “purify” the state of those
who opposed his ideals.50 He forcefully resisted reformists who wanted to subsume party policy under the
law as being “tainted with a bourgeois legal consciousness.”51
Although this form of socialist thought remains a dominant theme in present-day North Korea, Kim Il Sung
reformed his political ideology to embrace the doctrine of juche, which became the oﬃcial state doctrine
in 1972.52 Juche embodies the principle that North Korea ought to be prominent and preeminent in all
aspects of life.53 Its three pillars of political sovereignty, independent economy, and military self-defense
pervade everyday life for North Koreans.54 But just as signiﬁcantly, the doctrine conveniently reinforced
Kim Il Sung’s power, as juche by deﬁnition required him to “oﬃcially” disdain foreign inﬂuence and control,
permitting him to remain in sole control over North Korean aﬀairs.55
3. Kim Jong Il’s Ascendancy. – When Kim Il Sung died in 1994, his son Kim Jong Il came to
power, though he did not assume the oﬃce of President, as that position was memorialized in honor of
the late leader. Rather, Kim Jong Il became the General Secretary of the Party and the Chairman of the
National Defense Commission. On July 26, 1998, Kim Jong Il was oﬃcially and unanimously elected to the
SPA, and his positions were deemed the “highest post of the state.”56 His election, much like his father’s,
was accompanied by public declarations of adoration for the new leader. One voter fawningly exclaimed,
“Experiencing the same glee that our people felt when they held Great Leader Kim Il-sung in high esteem
as head of state ﬁfty years ago, I cast my ballot for the Supreme Commander, Kim Jong-il.”57 Although
technically a “new” leader, Kim Jong Il thus far has not strayed far from his father’s methods of governing.
50Goedde, supra note 48, at 1271; Yoon, supra note 43, at 1290.
51Goedde, supra note 48, at 1271.
52Id. at 1272.
53Lankov, supra note 22, at 62.
54Goedde, supra note 48, at 1272-73.
55“It is also likely that the ambitious Kim, who had long been living among constant eulogies, enjoyed the notion of himself
as a world-class theoretician and philosopher.” Lankov, supra note 22, at 67.
56Martin, supra note 17, at 551. In accordance with North Korean tradition and in honor of his father, Kim Jong Il waited
three full years before oﬃcially assuming control.
57Id.
14In addition to adhering strictly to the doctrine of juche, Kim Jong Il maintains a shroud of secrecy over his
personal and public aﬀairs.
B. Present Day North Korea
Given the myriad of obstacles faced during its history, North Korea’s resilience is noteworthy. Even as the
Soviet Union collapsed, as its allies refused diplomatic relations after the Korean War, as “the great socialist
experiment” was overrun by market capitalism, and as constitutional democratic politics emerged as the
new political order, North Korea did not waiver throughout these larger geopolitical changes.58 Despite –
or perhaps because of – this tenacious adherence to its established form of government, what is currently
known about North Korea remains limited in terms of both scope and accuracy. Restricted access and limited
availability of information make it diﬃcult to compose any descriptive accounts.59 This section summarizes
the key aspects of North Korean society with these caveats in mind.
1. Government. – (a) Branches of Government. – North Korea is a highly centralized communist
state composed of three branches of government – the executive, legislative, and judicial – that are controlled
58In fact, when China and Russia began incorporating aspects of market capitalism in the 1980s and 1990s, North Korea
criticized its former allies as “betraying socialism and the communist revolution.” Natsios, supra note 1, at 10. Part of North
Korea’s tenacity may be explained by its need to “save face” given its harsh remarks toward those abandoning socialist economic
systems.
59Almost all primary and secondary sources that report on any aspect of North Korea include at least a brief acknowledgement
of the practical limitations of their research. Certainly, most accounts would require at least some revision if North Korea were
to ever grant unhampered access to its archives.
15by the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), to which all government oﬃcials belong.60 Its executive branch
consists of a chief of state, called the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA),
and the head of government, called the Chairman of the National Defense Commission.61 When Kim Jong
Il formally took power three years after his father’s death, he was named General Secretary and conﬁrmed
as Chairman of the National Defense Commission by the SPA.62 Kim Yong Nam serves as the President of
the Presidium of the SPA, a position recognized to be nominal and titular.63
The legislative branch is made up by the SPA. Despite a regular four-year election cycle and formal recog-
nition as “the highest organ of state power,”64 the legislature usually only meets twice a year in order to
rubber-stamp decisions made by the KWP.65 The judicial branch includes the Central Court and lower
provincial, city, county, and military courts, all of which are checked by the SPA and the President.66
(b) Role of Law. – In spite of the categorical division of the government, the “actual lines of power and
authority” remain unclear.67 Thus, outsiders often characterize North Korea as a totalitarian state that is
above the law. It has been described as “a derivative of North Korean party policy, a means to implement
State objectives, a party code that citizens should follow, and a ruthless mechanism by which to punish
those that do not.”68 Moreover, the North Korean legal system is often attributed with the following traits:
“totalitarianism, single party rule, no civil society, socialist conceptions of rights as bourgeois, emphasis on








68Goedde, supra note 48, at 1268.
16duties to State, law as a tool of State interest, party policy preceding laws, and lawyers as State workers.”69
In short, the role of law in North Korea is understood as being signiﬁcant to the extent that the government
chooses to make it signiﬁcant.70
A large part of this reputation is attributed to the North Korean government structure and, necessarily, its
practical and pervasive impact on everyday life. As well-known to the international community, North Korea
operates under a long-standing dictatorship under which Kim Jong Il possesses Pope-like authority among
North Koreans. His words are regarded as “the quintessential source of enlightenment” and all other sources
of authority, such as the law or the constitution, are subsumed under his leadership.71 This dictatorship
is reinforced by the KWP, which is not only constitutionally sealed as the primary party but also legally
granted almost unfettered discretion in forming party directives.72 The KWP consists of “party elites and
chief governmental and military ﬁgures” and maintains its dominance over the citizens via surveillance and
indoctrination.73 The party operates in dynastic succession, determining an individual’s status on the basis
of one’s family name; those born into a “politically dangerous class” necessarily face “a lifetime of general
or strict surveillance.”74
Accordingly, the role of the Constitution and constitutional law in North Korea has similarly been criticized
as a subterfuge for political propaganda.75 The text is regarded as “a tool to showcase the superiority of
69Id. at 1267-68.
70See id. at 1268.
71Yoon, supra note 43, at 1291.
72Id. at 1290-91 (“The DPRK shall conduct all activities under the leadership of the Workers’ Party.” (quoting N. Korea
Const. art. 11 (1998))). There are a number of other intra- and extra-legal forces that contributed to the establishment of
North Korea’s one-man regime: “the build-up of pervasive intelligence mechanisms, strong military forces, indoctrination of the
people with a cult of personality, and near inclusive isolation of the populace from the outside world.” Yoon, supra note 43, at
1290.
73Id.
74Goedde, supra note 48, at 1274.
75See Yoon, supra note 43, at 1290-91, 1304 (“[Law] acts as a secondary instrument to enforce and realize the leader’s
directives, leaving its eﬃcacy as a thing of ridicule. Thus, law in North Korea is naturally mobilized for political purposes....”
(emphasis added)). Any analysis of the North Korean Constitution is largely limited to a textual interpretation since case law
is not public, rendering irrelevant any analysis of precedent. Id. at 1289; see also Goedde, supra note 48, at 1265. While such
analyses must be digested with the practical limitations in mind, there is still a plethora of compelling “secondary” sources for
17the State’s system to its citizens and outside observers.”76 Actual protection of individual liberties comes at
the government’s discretion, rendering fruitless any recourse to the Constitution for the eﬀectuation of such
rights.77 Rather, the Constitution is prescriptive: it “outlines the institutional apparatus of the State and
delineates the current policy objectives of the Party.”78
Technically, the North Korean Constitution is amendable by the SPA. But practically, given the totalitarian
state, amendments are “endorsed without opposition and manipulated by the country’s top leadership.”79
Indeed, all of the major and minor revisions have been approved by a unanimous vote.80 The political reality
is that any constitutional or legal change must come from top-down: “[R]evisions are possible at anytime the
country’s leadership decides to change the direction of State management or keep in step with environments
in ﬂux.”81
use.
76Yoon, supra note 43, at 1304.
77Id. at 1304-05.
78Goedde, supra note 48, at 1275.
79Yoon, supra note 43, at 1290 & n.1.
80See Goedde, supra note 48, at 1276; see generally Yoon, supra note 43.
81Yoon, supra note 43, at 1305.
182. Economy. – When North Korea formally separated from its
southern counterpart in 1953, the government established a cen-
trally planned economy, much like those economies of the former
Soviet Union.82 When Communist Eastern Europe collapsed in
1989 and the Soviet Union thereafter followed, these economies
restructured, liberalizing trade and investment.83 North Korea,
however, did not follow suit. It attempted to establish Special
Economic Zones (SEZ) to create manufacturing facilities, create
jobs, and improve production. But problems ranging from infras-
tructure to investment prospects kept these plans from fruition.84
North Korea did implement minor changes such as sharply in-
creasing its wages and prices, permitting markets and small pri-
vate sectors, amending foreign investment laws, and devaluing its
currency.85 The concomitant changes in enterprise and individual
economic behavior were met with a severe inﬂation.86 But for the
most part, North Korea maintains tight control over its economy.
In fact, in October 2005, North Korea reinstituted the public dis-
tribution system, which had shut down during the famine for lack
of resources, and accordingly prohibited the private sale of grain
on the market.87
Although its economy is often unstable, North Korea, contrary to presumptions, is not ﬁnancially destitute.
Its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004 was reported at $40 billion, with its per capita GDP at $1,700.88
North Korea’s per capita income is estimated to be between $1,200 and $2,000, which is larger than those
82Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 12.






19countries in South Asia and Africa that also suﬀer chronic food shortages.89 Its economic troubles therefore
do not stem from ﬁscal incapacity but rather, the government’s insistence on allotting about 25% of its entire
GNP to the military.
89Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 521. These South Asian and African countries have per capita incomes that are
below $1,000. Id.
20North Korea’s main trading partners now include China, Japan,
India, Russia, South Korea, and Thailand.90 Figures from 2003 es-
timate imports of petroleum, coal, machinery, textiles, and grain at
$2.1 billion; exports of minerals, metallurgical products, textiles,
and ﬁshing products are estimated at $1.2 billion.91 North Korea
is also known to make hundreds of millions of dollars from the sale
of missiles, narcotics, and counterfeit items (e.g., cigarettes, U.S.
currency).923. Agriculture. – North Korea is a relatively small
country, spanning 12 million hectacres,93 or about 47,000 square
miles.94 Collective, socialist farms represent the “basic institutional
structure” of North Korea’s agriculture95 and make up about 30%
of the total population (as of 1998).96 Of the total land area, ap-
proximately 14% is arable, most of which is occupied by rice and
corn production.97 The summer growing season lasts June to Octo-
ber – which is the only possible time for growing food98 – is short,
with “cold snaps” sometimes cutting across the country because of
North Korea’s susceptibility to Siberia’s cold winds.99 Under these
“ordinary climactic conditions” and considering the country’s ap-
propriate diet needs for its population, “a 12 percent shortfall of
grain might be expected in any given year.”100
4. Military. – A description of North Korea would not be complete without some mention of the govern-
ment’s military and defense capacities. North Korea expressly pursues a “military ﬁrst” policy. Accordingly,
90U.S. Dept of State, supra note 25. The United States, though it previously prohibited all trade with North Korea, has eased
sanctions since 1989. Both imports and exports are permitted though neither are conducted at more than marginal levels. Id.
91Id.
92Id.
93Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 521.
94U.S. Dept of State, supra note 25. The country is about the size of Mississippi.
95These collective farms are the result of the Land Reform Act, which was one of the ﬁrst statutes passed after North Korea’s
establishment in 1946. The Act redistributed almost half of the country’s total farmland from private landowners to farmers
and then converted them into collective farms. For a more speciﬁc discussion of how the Act accomplished collectivization, see
Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 521.
96Id. In 1948, farm households made up as much as 75% of the population.
97Id.
98Daniel Goodkind & Loraine West, The North Korean Famine and Its Demographic Impact, 27 Population & Dev. Rev.
219, 221 (2001) (citing Food & Agricultural Org., FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (Special Report, Nov. 16, 2000)).
99Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 521.
100Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221 (citing Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19). In other words, North Korea’s
adherence to juche in the context of food production and consumption is an ideal, not a realistic possibility.
21the North Korean army is the fourth largest in the world and its special operations forces is the second
largest.101 Approximately 20% of all men between 17 and 54 years of age serve in the regular armed forces
and there is a total of 1.2 million armed personnel.102 More than 25% of its GDP is devoted to the military,
with the number of tanks, artillery, and other weaponry often far outnumbering the stock of other countries
such as South Korea.103
5. Foreign Relations & Policy. – North Korea undoubtedly is still the most isolationist country in
the world. But there have been small, gradual openings. Its bilateral relationships now include various
countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Philippines, and the United Kingdom.104 North Korea
also continues to maintain a diplomatic relationship with South Korea though its policy wavers from time
to time. Currently, it is seeking to develop economic ties and to garner South Korean public support for
better North-South relations; at the same time, North Korea continues to criticize its southern counterpart
for their security relationship with the United States.105
With respect to its nuclear weapons, North Korea expressed intentions to normalize relations with the United
States by agreeing to future discussions of highly sensitive issues such as human rights abuses, criminal
activities, terrorism, and of course, proliferation and weapons programs.106 Again, these “openings” are not
watershed moments of North Korean history. More accurately, they merely reﬂect a few minor counter-
examples to North Korea’s usual isolationism.






22III. The Famine and Food Shortage Crisis
In the mid- to late-1990s, North Korea experienced one of the worst famines in the twentieth century. An
important clue as to the extent of the famine’s devastation was the government’s sudden openness to the
international community, at least relative to its usual isolationist disposition. Since the end of the Korean
War, North Korea had consistently criticized the United State and South Korea, expressing fear of invasion by
these two countries.107 Yet on June 21, 1995, as part of an inter-Korean accord on emergency rice aid, North
Korea agreed to receive an unprecedented 150,000 ton rice loan from South Korea.108 And in September
1995, North Korea publicly announced a food shortage and appealed to the WFP and other governments
for help.109 While these acts and statements are normally routine for a country hit by natural disasters,
the international community took note of what were aberrant moves for a country like North Korea. Given
the government’s ﬁrm adherence to juche and the fact that it had repeatedly rejected oﬀers from willing
governments and organizations in the past, this departure from the country’s doctrine constituted “ideological
heresy” – “an admission of failure that would cause the regime to ‘lose face.”’110 There was deﬁnite reason
for concern.
A. Impact
The precise demographic impact of the famine remains uncertain,111 since the government’s intense secrecy
107Natsios, supra note 1, at 6.
108Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 519.
109Natsios, supra note 1, at 5.
110Id. at 6.
111This section examines the impact of famine on the aﬀected population largely in terms of the victims’ physical and mental
consequences, though it recognizes that this may not be the “best” approach to studying impact. See Arnold, supra note 2,
23prevents access to the necessary data for any robust analysis or for even raw quantitative ﬁgures.112 In a
series of oﬃcial media reports, North Korea estimated that about 220,000 people had died from 1995 to
1998.113 According to North Korean refugees, the estimate ran signiﬁcantly higher, as their ﬁgure reached
about 3.5 million casualties from starvation and other related illnesses during the same period.114 A fairly
recent study speciﬁcally focusing on the North Korean famine’s demographic impact concluded that there
were 600,000 to 1 million famine-related deaths from 1995 to 2000.115 One million deaths is the equivalent
of about ﬁve percent of North Korea’s total population.116
Apart from physical deaths, millions of North Koreans are reported to still be enduring other consequences
of the famine,117 including stunted development, impaired health, and psychological breakdowns.118 A
1998 nutritional survey by the WFP, UNICEF, EU, and the DPRK Institute of Child Nutrition revealed
that 16% of the population and 30% of children between 2 and 12 years of age suﬀered acute malnutrition
(wasting), and as much as 60% suﬀered chronic malnutrition (stunting).119 Studies have also reported
other consequences that have not yet been quantiﬁed, though they have a signiﬁcant demographic impact
at 74 (“[T]here is a danger, in representing human experience exclusively in these terms, of overlooking the ways in which the
famine-struck actively resist the onset of hunger and destitution, and, for as long as they are able to do so, do not passively
accept the statues of ‘victims’.... To see starvation only as a pathological or physiological state is to deny to famine suﬀerers
the capacity for self-help, for moral indignation and rational protest.”).
112Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 520.
113Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 219 (citing S. China Morning Post, May 10, 1999; Hong Kong Standard, May 10,
1999).
114Fiona Terry, Feeding the Dictator, The Guardian, Aug. 6, 2001, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,532339,00.html; see also Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 219-20 (re-
stating a French newspaper’s estimates of about 3.5 million deaths). The North Korean government denounced such big
estimates as “vicious rumors.” Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 220.
115Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 220. The authors frankly acknowledge that, despite a comprehensive study, the ﬁgure
is still “uncertain.” Id. For details about the study’s methodology, sources, and ﬁndings, see id. at 225-33. See also id. at 234
(explaining three qualiﬁcations to the estimated number of famine deaths).
116Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 7.
117As a general matter, it is reported that epidemics often accompany famines for “both physiological and social reasons.”
Namely, the “self-mobilization of the weak and hungry” to other neighboring regions resulted in the “spreading [of] disease...
to [those] not directly aﬀected by hunger.” Arnold, supra note 2, at 23.
118See, e.g., Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 9; see also id. at 18 (As in other famines, most of these excess deaths were
not due to starvation per se. As caloric intake falls, immune systems weaken and people typically succumb to diseases such as
tuberculosis before starving to death....”).
119Jongeun Lee, Study of the International Food Security Regime: Food Aid to North Korea During the Famine of 1995-2000,
11 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1037, 1042 (2004) (citing United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. Jan.-Dec. 2000 (Nov. 1999)). Note that because the survey was conducted in 1998, these statistics
may not accurately reﬂect the full impact of the famine.
24during famines; these include stillbirths, miscarriages, and foregone conceptions. Of those who managed to
escape to China, leaving the famine crisis as well their families behind, several admit being unable to lead a
“normal life” in their new surroundings; children in particular report suﬀering intense anxiety merely over
the prospect of having to return to North Korea.120 As to both casualties and subsequent health and mental
consequences, the groups most aﬀected included children and the elderly.121
Apart from statistics and data, another indicator of the famine’s severe impact includes anecdotal evidence
about the eﬀect of food shortages on the military. These stories may be more telling as to the famine’s
devastation, since the military represents “the best-fed large segment of the populace” and yet it also fell
prey to the famine. One oﬃcial relayed the following story of two North Korean frontline unit soldiers who
were found by the South Koreans ashore:
[The soldiers] got washed away in a boat while checking their nets seeking pro-
tein. They stayed approximately two days in the boat, and were almost dead when
rescued. [The South Koreans examined the soldiers]. They found both had liver
dysfunction due to chronic malnutrition. Both had kidney dysfunction and skin
discoloration. Both had severe dental problems. The big one was ﬁve feet ﬁve and
a half inches tall. The other one was four-foot-eleven. The big one, nineteen years
old, weighed 98 pounds. The little one, twenty-two, was eighty-nine pounds.122
Upon their return, the oﬃcial noted that the physical demeanor of these soldiers were not aberrations from
the unit, but entirely reﬂective of the others’ size. He also speculates that, drawing from ﬁrst-hand witness,
that other army men are “chronically undernourished,” “not in very good health,” and failing to reach
“genetic potential.”123
120Kim, supra note 16. Indeed, escaping North Korea does not by itself restore these refugees’ lives. For example, North
Korean girls living in China are sometimes traﬃcked and sold for as little as $50 and as “much” as $1,200. Id.
121Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 18; see also Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 25.
123Id.
25B. Causes
There have been a number of diﬀerent reasons proﬀered as the cause of the famine and the current food
shortage in North Korea.124 The explanations most frequently discussed are summarized below. In evaluating
the factors, it seems likely that all of the aforementioned causes contributed to the problem though perhaps
North Korea’s politically-driven policymaking appears to be the most culpable.
1. Political Changes & Economic Impact. – Despite North Korea’s assertion of juche, whether the
government has actually adhered to the strict doctrine is dubious, especially given the reports of reliance
on other socialist countries throughout its history.125 During the Soviet occupation, for example, the So-
viet Union provided considerable assistance – an estimated $1,146 million in credits and grants between
1945-1970.126 Speciﬁcally, the Soviet Union provided heavy subsidies for energy, petroleum, fertilizer, and
manufactured products;127 at times, it would even accept unmarketable North Korean goods or simply per-
mit debt to be paid when North Korea was able to do so in order to spur the new economy.128 Indeed, it
was this type of generous assistance that helped build the North Korean economy and turn it into a relative
success early in its existence.129
124See, e.g., Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 219 (“The origins and duration of the North Korean famine can be attributed
to a series of natural calamities, human and organizational deﬁciencies in responding to them, and the general economic decline
of the country experienced after the collapse of the Soviet Union.”).
125Some South Korean revisionist historians question how signiﬁcant a role the Soviet Union actually played in North Korea’s
development. But see Lankov, supra note 22, at 194 (“[T]he Soviet presence (indeed, omnipresence) was the single most
important fact of North Korean politics of the late 1940s.”).
126Id. at 63 (citing Nicholas Eberstadt, Marc Rubin & Albina Tretyakova, The Collapse of Soviet and Russian Trade with
the DPRK, 1989-1993: Impact and Implications, 4 Korean J. Nat’l Unification 87-104 (1995)); see also Amnesty Int’l,
supra note 5, at 6-7.
127Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 13; Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 519.
128Lankov, supra note 22, at 63.
129See id. Soviet (and Chinese) aid were not limited to those mentioned above. Other forms of assistance ranged from
providing free weapons to training North Korean workforces. Id. The Soviet Union did temporarily cut oﬀ aid when North
26By the early 1980s, however, the economy began suﬀering from the lack of market incentives (as did other
socialist economies)130 and the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 exacerbated what became North Korea’s “se-
vere economic decline.”131 Soviet exports drastically fell from $1.97 billion to $0.58 billion in just one year
from 1990 to 1991; and by 1993, export levels had declined to a mere 10% of its previous contributions.132
The impact was obvious: North Korea suﬀered severe supply shortages for their agricultural needs,133 in-
cluding its petroleum supply, which in turn failed to satisfy North Korean demand for fuel and feedstock for
petrochemical plants.134
Despite some temporary assistance from China,135 the political and economic impact of these geopolitical
changes left a considerable impression on North Korea.136 Although China initially increased its exports,
from $0.39 billion in 1990 to $0.66 billion in 1993 (and then back down to $0.47 billion in 1994), its partnership
with North Korea substantially fell short of the previous Soviet contributions.137
North Korea faced other foreign policy troubles during its 1992-1994 nuclear crisis with the United States.138
Korea began turning to China in the mid-1960s for political as well as cultural alliance. Id. at 65-66.
130See Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 220 (noting that problems with the North Korean economy “occurred well before
the summer ﬂoods of 1995 that formally precipitated the famine”).
131Id. at 220.
132Id. at 221.
133Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 519. At the same time, these political events weakened Soviet control, providing Kil
Il Sung an excellent opportunity to hoard control over North Korea. Indeed, he capitalized on “this newly-found independence...
to increase his personal power.” Lankov, supra note 22, at 64. There is some speculation that if the Soviets retained relatively
the same quantum of control, North Korea might be “less repressive and economically more successful.” Id.
134Id. at 522.
135Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 13. China eventually demanded hard currency for its exports, thereby cutting oﬀ
trade with North Korea. Id.
136It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union that the North Korean government realized its extensive reliance on
foreign aid – that it was “a much greater role in the... economy than Pyongyang propaganda had ever been prepared to admit.”
Lankov, supra note 22, at 75. In other words, juche proved to be a ﬁction.
137Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221 (citing Nicholas Eberstadt, Christina W. Harbaugh, Marc Rubin & Loraine A.
West, China’s Trade with the DPRK, 1990-1994, Korea & World Aff., Winter 1995, at 665-85).
138Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 13. At least one commentator has drawn a correlation between the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the nuclear crisis, arguing that North Korea played the “nuclear card” out of its desperation for foreign aid.
See Lankov, supra note 22, at 75.
27While Kim Il Sung successfully extracted economic aid from the United States by using its mysterious nuclear
program as bait,139 he also drew considerable attention from the media and the international community,
most of which was negative. These problems with foreign countries then compounded with domestic issues,
especially the death of Kim Il Sung at the close of the nuclear crisis in 1994.140 All in all, the various political
and economic changes debilitated North Korea and may have prevented it from being able to meet even the
“basic needs” of its citizens.141
2. Agronomic Changes. – In the early 1990s, a cold front hit the Korean peninsula, damaging crops
and creating pest problems.142 In 1995, this situation was further exacerbated by a series of ﬂoods that
devastated over 400,000 hectares of arable land.143 Grain production as a result was reduced by 1.9 million
tons,144 or about 30% of the total amount of grain necessary to feed the people.145 Then in 1996, another
set of ﬂoods hit the “breadbasket” section of North Korea, that is, the area responsible for producing 60%
of the country’s food grain; loss of grain production was estimated at about 300,000 tons.146 By 1996, the
139Lankov, supra note 22, at 76.
140Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 13. Kim Il Sung died on July 8, 1994 in Pyongyang from a sudden heart attack.
Lankov, supra note 22, at 76.
141Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221 (listing the U.S. trade embargo and North Korea’s inability to purchase grain in
the international market as other reasons for the economic crisis).
142Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 519-20.
143Id.; Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221 (citing USAID, North Korea Food/Health Emergency Fact Sheet #2, Fiscal
Year 1998, July 28, 1998, http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/
98b/0005.html; Judith Katona-Apte & Ali Mokdad, Malnutrition of Children in the Democratic People’s Republic of North
Korea, 128 J. Nutrition 1315-19 (1998)). In addition to the devastation caused to land, about 500,000 people were displaced,
and almost 300 health facilities were damaged, one of which was the only facility capable of producing an oral rehydration
solution. Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221, 223.
144Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 519-20; Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221 (citing USAID, North Korea
Food/Health Emergency Fact Sheet #2, Fiscal Year 1998, July 28, 1998, http://iys.cidi.org/humanitarian/hsr/98b/0005.html;
Judith Katona-Apte & Ali Mokdad, Malnutrition of Children in the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, 128 J.
Nutrition 1315-19 (1998)).
145Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221 (citing United Nations Development Programme, Thematic Roundtable
Meeting on Agricultural Recovery and Economic Protection in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK), available at http://www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/drkext.pdf (1998)).
146Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221 (citing Food & Agricultural Org., FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply
Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Special Report, Jun. 3, 1996)).
28agronomic problems obstructing production eﬀorts were deemed chronic.147
The ﬂoods were followed by droughts in 2000 and 2001. The latter drought was determined to be the “largest
spring drought in recorded history” and the damages created loss of soil moisture, depletion of reservoirs,











SOURCE: Amnesty Int’l, supra note X, at 11 (using
North Korean Government 2nd Periodic report to
CESCR 22 tbl. 7 (2002)).
Coupled with these natural disasters, North Korean agriculture was also impacted by the political and
economic changes discussed above. Because the government relied on industrial imports, such as chemical
fertilizers, insecticides, and fuel, electrical irrigation systems and basic agricultural needs were no longer
sustainable at the same levels once political changes stripped North Korea of the beneﬁts of subsidies.149
These shortages necessarily aﬀected production levels; for example, nitrogen fertilizer production fell 136,000
147Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 519-20. Early in 1997, there was some anticipation that North Korea’s crop
production would improve, but higher temperatures and less rainfall than average left the situation less than hopeful. Reports
of grain losses ranged between 700,000 tons to 1.9 million tons. Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 223 (citing Drought-Hit
DPRK Has Shower of Rain, but No Gain for Land, The People’s Korea, Aug. 6, 1997, available at http://www1.korea-
np.co.jp/pk/003rd issue/97080505.htm; Katona-Apte & Mokdad, supra note 144).
148Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 7.
149Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 13-14.
29tons (from 217,000 tons to 81,000) between 1995 to 1997.150
3. Politics & Policy. – Some scholars, while admitting that the economic and agricultural changes
were pertinent factors, contend that the North Korean famine was ultimately the product of poor policy
decisions driven by political considerations. This line of argument essentially attributes fault on the North
Korean government along two dimensions: ﬁrst, it may suggest fault along causation, and second, along
perpetuation. On the “least culpable” end, North Korea may be responsible for the famine in that it failed
to take suﬃcient action to curtail the eﬀects of a famine created by uncontrollable natural forces. On the
“most culpable” end, North Korea created the famine through a series of deliberate policy decisions and
then perpetuated the famine by refusing to undertake suﬃcient remedial action.151 The latter possibility
seems especially diﬃcult to believe, given its amoral (or immoral) implications. But factoring in what is
known about the nature and operation of the North Korea government, the argument emerges as a tenable
possibility.
To begin with, compared with more aﬄuent countries in its region, such as South Korea and Japan, North
Korea actually has a higher self-suﬃciency ratio for grain consumption in a normal year; South Korea and
Japan rely on imports for more than half of their grain where as North Korea has only a 12% domestic
shortfall.152 Thus, “the food shortfalls could be easily overcome by increased imports of grain,”153 meaning
that North Korea could have designed an agricultural policy that incorporated imports from foreign economic
systems154 or that other states could have “restructured trade policy [to] recognize[] North Korea’s position
150Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221 (citing United Nations Development Programme, Thematic Roundtable
Meeting on Agricultural Recovery and Economic Protection in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK), available at http://www.undp.org/execbrd/pdf/drkext.pdf (1998)).
151In the middle, of course is an explanation that confers a moderate degree of blame along both dimensions. For instance,
North Korea may have adopted misguided agricultural policies that created famine conditions, being unaware of the devastating
consequences, but it may have made genuine attempts at remedying the deﬁciencies by asking the international community for
help.
152Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 532.
153Id.
154See id.
30as a natural food importer.”155 Yet rather than adopt a policy that would rely on outside assistance, North
Korea attempted to respond to these agricultural constraints and food shortages with responses that would
not contradict the radically self-suﬃcient ideals of juche doctrine.156 For instance, the government promoted
a “Let’s eat only two meals a day” campaign in 1991.157 Refugees testiﬁed that the government also began
reducing or cutting oﬀ food distributions at around this time, with PDS stations closing in several locations
as early as 1994.158
Other pieces of evidence further corroborate the idea that the famine was a deliberate choice on the part of the
North Korean government. A particularly disturbing report documented a public statement by Kim Jong Il
in 1996 where he argued that only 30% of the population was needed to “reconstruct a victorious society.”159
Moreover, although the ﬂoods were certainly devastating and impacted production levels, studies revealed
that North Korea’s grain output began its decline before the ﬂoods in the early 1990s.160 And a nutritional
survey in 1998 reported that “children have been suﬀering from inadequate food supply for many years.”161
Early warning signs were in place. In fact, famine experts could have easily recognized the potential onset
155Id. This reﬂects just one possible policy choice, not the only choice at North Korea’s disposal. The point is that something
could have been done to remedy its domestic shortfall, though admittedly, such a response would have contradicted the
government’s adherence to juche.
156Admittedly, these poor agricultural policy choices were not new policies suddenly adopted by the regime; rather, they trace
back to North Korea’s origins. When the 38th parallel was oﬃcially drawn in 1953, separating the North from the more agrarian
South – originally the “breadbasket” for the peninsula – the new North Korean government naturally ﬁxed upon food security
as one of its main policy goals. Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 12. Though this was an understandable concern, North
Korea miscalculated when it decided that maintaining the ideals of self-suﬃciency at the national, provincial, and county levels
could still help eﬀectuate its goals. Id. This “wrong turn” was not only a rhetorical error but also a practical one: North Korea’s
high ratio of people to arable land, northern latitude, and short growing season would not permit a self-suﬃciency-based policy.
Id. at 12-13.
157Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 221 (citing Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson & Tao Wang, Famine in North Korea:
Causes and Cures (Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper 1999)).
158Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 14.
159Terry, supra note 114.
160Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 13; see also Natsios, supra note 1, at 11 (“Although the ﬂoods of 1995 marked the
oﬃcial beginning of the great North Korea famine, food shortages began well before the oﬃcial date of the appeal for help.”
(emphases added)).
161Lee, supra note 119, at 1042 (emphasis added) (citing United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. Jan.-Dec. 2000 (Nov. 1999)).
31of famine if they had been permitted free access to investigate the situation.162 The government, however,
never let on to its problems or any other information until the situation had considerably worsened. It was
only when famine had swept through many regions of the country and at least hundreds of thousands had
suﬀered that North Korea asked for international relief. For the North Korean government, which probably
had some knowledge of its food shortages, the ﬂoods proved fortuitous: it gave the government a legitimate,
objectively veriﬁable reason for requesting extensive international aid.
In light of the above evidence, scholars therefore argue that “even with considerable attention to agricultural
production in the past, it seems clear that North Korea’s food problems are due to policy choices by the
government, not simply to a lack of national income.”163 In this view, the government is the “chief culprit”
for the famine and food crisis:164
Dictatorial and omnipresent, the regime held rigidly to a self-destructive agricul-
tural system and impoverishing industrial policies while walling itself oﬀ from the
rest of the world. When its food supply failed, it had no foreign exchange with
which to buy food and no friends from whom to ask for food. The regime then
made the situation far worse by deciding for political reasons to triage one area
of the country and to reduce rations to farmers nationwide. Most analyses of the
North Korean famine... have been conducted using the disciplines of public health,
nutrition, national agricultural production, and food aid distribution. But famines
at their core are principally economic and political phenomena with public health
and nutritional consequences, not vice versa.165
A recent study by the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea reiterated that the famine crisis
of the 1990s was avoidable, if only North Korea had made more humanitarian policy choices. For instance,
rather than using foreign aid to supplement its domestic production and importation of food supplies, the
162Natsios, supra note 1, at 6-7.
163Kim, Lee & Sumner, supra note 19, at 521 (emphases added).
164Natsios, supra note 1, at x. Natsios refers speciﬁcally to the North Korean famine of the 1990s, but his arguments regarding
the North Korean government’s failure to respond to the speciﬁc crisis generally apply to the country’s recurring food shortage
problem.
32government chose to substitute such aid.166 This study extrapolated North Korea’s food supplies using
the country’s 1993 commercial food imports levels and concluded that, at both the high-end and low-end
estimations, North Korea would have exceeded the average human consumption need if it had continued its
usual rates of production and received imports.167 Yet when North Korea began receiving aid, the saved
expenses were allocated elsewhere, namely to the North Korean military.168
From objective statistical data about agricultural productions to more sensational reports of North Korea’s
callousness toward human suﬀering, a considerable amount of evidence supports the notion that the famine
was both caused and perpetuated by the government itself. Rather than acknowledging its inability to
support domestic food needs with its own supplies, North Korea insisted on its adherence to juche. In short,
ideology trumped all other considerations, even potential starvation. This form of single-mindedness also
characterized North Korea’s response to relief eﬀorts, as it chose to substitute and divert aid even though
such subversive acts would delay the alleviation of famine consequences.
C. The Responses to the Famine
Initially, the international community hesitated at North Korea’s sudden appeal for help. Political reasons
lurked in the background and the simple lack of information raised further concern about the extent of
North Korea’s crises. Eventually, as the famine and news of its devastation spread, several governments and
segments of the international community responded to the crisis.
166Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 7, 11.
167Id. at 16-17 & ﬁg.3.
168Id. at 7, 11.
331. The North Korean Government’s Response. – Since the 1950s, more than a majority of North
Koreans have received their food through the public distribution system (PDS). The PDS requires collective
farmers in agricultural regions to donate a portion of their production to the government and then reallo-
cates the surplus to urban regions, which cannot grow their own foods.169 About 62% of the entire North
Korean population, which represents the entire urban population, receives food through this government-run
system.170 Before the ﬂoods, recipients were generally allotted 600-700 grams per day while high oﬃcials,
military men, heavy laborers, and public security personnel were allotted slightly larger portions of 700-800
grams per day.171
Decreases in production aﬀected the quantum of food available through the public distribution system.
Shortages were compounded when the North Korean government imposed further restrictions on collective
farmers. When farmers, who had never been covered by the PDS, were mandated by the government to
reduce their own food allotments from 167 kilograms to 107 kilograms of grain per person each year, they
responded by withholding portions of the required amount of grain.172 Famine refugees reported that the
government decreased PDS rations to 150 grams in 1994 and to as low as 30 grams by 1997.173 It was further
reported that the PDS failed to provide any food from April to August 1998 (the “lean” season) as well
as from March to June 1999.174 In January 1998, the North Korean government publicly announced that
the PDS would no longer distribute rations and that families needed to somehow procure their own food
supplies.175 As the failure of its public distribution system became more diﬃcult to conceal, North Korea
appealed for international relief, consistently invoking the ﬂoods as the reason for its need of assistance.
169Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 223.
170Id.
171Id. at 224. It is often pointed out that actual distribution often failed to meet oﬃcial quotas even before the famine.
172Id.
173Id. (citing W. Courtland Robinson, Myung Ken Lee, Kenneth Hill & Gilbert M. Burnham, Mortality in North Korean
Migrant Households: A Retrospective Study, 354 The Lancet 291-95 (1999)). Amnesty International reports that only 6% of
the population could be supplied through the PDS by 1997. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 8-9.
174Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 9.
175Id.
34There are other reports that the PDS stopped distributions entirely in more marginalized, rural regions in
the northern and eastern parts of the country.176 For example, the mountainous provinces of North and
South Hamgyong and Rynagang stopped receiving shipments even though these regions were among the most
PDS-dependent areas.177 Rather than food coming through some equitable, predictable channels, people
came to rely on the eﬀorts of “entrepreneurial local leaders” who had to exercise political clout or gather
enough resources to get to distribution points.178
176See Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 17.
177Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 9.
178Lautze, supra note 18, at *9. Such a situation is unsurprising, as it is consistent with overall concerns about the fairness
of the PDS. Distribution by the government has been known to depend on a subjective system of beneﬁciary identiﬁcation.
For many citizens, it was important to remain loyal to the government so as not to ruin one’s chances to receive adequate
food. If an individual was perceived as displaying “even a sign of suspicion that [one] has lost blind faith,” the North Korean
government inﬂicted far-reaching sanctions: the suspected individual would not only be precluded from food aid, but he could
also lose opportunities for medical aid, education, and employment. See Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 7.
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2. The North Korean Citizens’ Response. – As the famine conditions worsened, particularly in
the rural regions of the country, North Koreans took to various survival mechanisms. At one end, North
Koreans simply resorted to gathering wild foods, such as roots, corn stalks, and grass; a “common” meal
often consisted of a mixture of ﬁnely ground grass and cereal.179 According to the FAO and the WFP,
these “alternative” foods exacerbated nutritional deﬁciencies and other health problems such as children’s
diarrhea.180
Other families sought assistance from relatives living in more arable areas. Still other families attempted a
more entrepreneurial response by engaging in black market sales and exchanges or setting up barters and
trading relationship.181 The informal markets ranged from asset-for-asset exchanges to more illicit forms of
prostitution and human traﬃcking.182 It is estimated that about 300 farmer or consumer markets emerged
by the end of the 1990s and that these arenas provided 70-80% of food needs (though the food was provided
at prices that were 3 to 3.5 times higher than the PDS prices).183
At the more extreme end, some individuals resorted to “distress migration,”184 escaping North Korea and
179Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 10.
180Id.
181Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 19.
182Id. at 22.
183Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 12 (citing Meredith Woo-Cumings, The Political Ecology of Famine: The North Korean
Catastrophe and Its Lessons 30 (Asian Development Bank Institute, Research Paper No. 31, Jan. 2002).
184D’Souza, supra note 1, at 8. Unfortunately, many refugees did not encounter signiﬁcant changes in their situation even
when they successfully escaped North Korea. For example, North Koreans who escaped to China often “live[d] in appalling
conditions and [became] vulnerable to physical, emotional and sexual exploitation.” They also lived in constant fear of being
caught, as Chinese government surveillance increased in response to the inﬂux of refugees from North Korea.
Because the Chinese government does not oﬀer asylum rights, even when individuals ﬂee in the face of persecution, detected
refugees can be forcibly repatriated into their countries. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 30-31. As the following ﬁrst-hand
testimony reveals, repatriated refugees often face harsh, even torturous treatment upon their arrival in North Korea:
I was caught in August 2001 in China. Right after my arrest, I was sent to a Chinese police station, then a Chinese detention
centre for seven days; later I was transferred to the border police for three days (interrogated by patrol (border) police for one
day); the National Security Police then detained me for 10 days for interrogation; I was then sent to a labour training camp for
15 days. I was ﬁnally detained in a detention centre in Chongjin for three months. At the border patrol detention centre, I was
asked how long I had stayed in China; if I had met South Koreans or church people; I was undressed and completely checked,
even my vagina was checked by one person to see if I had hidden any money.
....
37often ﬂeeing to nearby China. Because North Korea criminalizes all travel conducted without permits, these
escapees risked much for just the hope of leaving behind their predicament.185 Indeed, if a North Korean
citizen were caught crossing “a frontier of the Republic,” he could be subject to punishment of up to three
years in a political penal labor colony.186 These facilities were established in direct response by the North
Korean government to the increase in illegal movements within and outside the country; called “9-27 camps,”
the facilities are known to inﬂict torture and even force abortions and commit infanticide against pregnant
women.187
3. The International Community’s Response. – In 1997, UNICEF reported a dramatic increase in
the number of North Korean children suﬀering from severe food shortages. At least 80,000 children were
considered severely malnourished and “in imminent peril of succumbing to starvation or disease”;188 and
about 800,000 children under ﬁve were suﬀering “milder” forms of malnutrition.189 UNICEF also revealed
that the group of children most susceptible to these health consequences were orphans, with about 50% of
children in orphanages detected as being “severely malnourished.”190
Despite such compelling reports, public enthusiasm for providing relief to North Korea languished at ﬁrst.191
The WFP192 ultimately responded to North Korea’s appeal for assistance. After a team of technical experts
My husband tortured in the next room to where I was interrogated; he was handcuﬀed and beaten by a stick. It appears
that he confessed to plans (that we were going to South Korea). I heard that he could not walk, that all his teeth had gone; he
died in November 1998. I never saw him again. I found out abut my husband’s death [by torture] only in February 2000 when
I was transferred to a provincial detention facility....
Id. at 32-33 (quoting Testimony by Kim with Amnesty International (Dec. 7, 2002)).
185Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 20. The ability to emigrate and immigrate is a fundamental right in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. North Korea, despite being
a state party to the ICCPR, still punishes travel without permits. Id.
186Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting N. Korean Criminal Code, art. 117).
187Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 20. The term “9-27 camp” derives from the date (Sept. 27, 1995) that Kim Jong
Il issued an order establishing these detention facilities. These facilities are reportedly overcrowded and mistreat its detainees.
For example, some detainee testimonies state that food consists of 80 kernels of corn for every meal, or of three to four spoons
of corn meal mixed with hot water. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 34-35.
188Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 9.
189Id.
190Id. (citing Andrew Natsios, The Politics of Famine in North Korea 5-11 (U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 51,
Aug. 1999)).
191See, e.g., Natsios, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that if it had been any other country, the international community would
have probably responded “without much hesitancy”).
192Originally created in 1963 as an experimental program, the WFP has grown into the “world’s largest international food aid
38with the Food and Agricultural Organization193 (FAO) assessed the agricultural conditions and the level of
production, the WFP requested donations from the United States, Canada, and the European Union.194
As a result of the international community’s contributions, North Korea is currently one of the largest
recipients of food aid in the world. Every year, it receives about 1 million tons of food, most of which comes
through the WFP.195 Since 1995, the WFP alone has provided 1.8 million metric tons, valued at $635 million,
to North Korea.196 And during the famine, the WFP rapidly and substantially increased aid from 5,000 to
387,000 tons, making up almost 50% of all foreign aid received by North Korea.197 North Korea has also
received substantial aid – over $2 billion during the last ten years – from other governments.198 The United
States alone has contributed over $600 million in food aid,199 possessing the title of the “largest donor of
humanitarian assistance since 1995.”200
In order to better carry out its relief eﬀorts, the WFP also established oﬃces in North Korea for the purposes
of monitoring food distribution. Forty-one international aid workers were stationed in the central Pyongyang
oﬃce as well as in the Chongjin, Hamhung, Sinuiju, Wonson, and Hyesan oﬃces.201
organization combating hunger in underdeveloped nations with severe food shortages.” The twin aims of the WFP is to meet
emergency food needs and to support economic and social development. United Nations World Food Programme, Introduction,
History, Mission, http://www.wfp.org/aboutwfp/introduction/index.asp?
section=1&sub section=1 (last visited Mar. 15, 2006); see also Lee, supra note 119, at 1039-40.
193Founded in 1945, the FAO is the UN agency charged with executing the “international eﬀorts to defeat hunger.” Its four
main purposes include: (1) putting information within reach; (2) sharing policy expertise; (3) providing a meeting place for all
nations; and (4) bringing knowledge to the ﬁeld. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, FAO at Work:
About Us, http://www.fao.org/ UNFAO/about/index en.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006); see also Lee, supra note 119, at
1038-39. Whereas the WFP delivers emergency food aid, the FAO focuses more on agricultural rehabilitation and development.
194Natsios, supra note 1, at 6.
195Terry, supra note 114.
196Lee, supra note 119, at 1043.
197Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 224.
198Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 10.
199See Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 224-25 (citing N. Korea Back from the Brink: Aid Helps End Mass Starvation,
Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 2000, at A01) (describing the United States as a “major bilateral donor”).
200Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 10. To put the donation amount in diﬀerent terms, $600 million in food aid is about
2 million metric tons of grain. Id.
201Lee, supra note 119, at 1043.
39D. The Problems with Relief Assistance
In recent years, a “fatigue among donors” has settled for a myriad of reasons.202 Various organizations,
including Action Against Hunger, Care International, Doctors Without Borders, Doctors of the World, and
Oxfam have withdrawn their operations in North Korea.203 The response eﬀorts allude to at least two clear
reasons for this fatigue – one practical, the other political.204 Although the practical necessarily ﬂows from
the political in the context of North Korea, this section identiﬁes the more speciﬁc problem, which is a
distinct issue relevant to relief eﬀorts generally, and then discusses the larger problem in order to highlight
the additional complications that compound the former issue.
1. Monitoring & Compliance. – In theory, the WFP directs its relief to those North Koreans who
are determined to be the most “vulnerable” to famine: school children, pregnant women, new mothers,
the elderly, and the sick.205 In practice, however, there is widespread suspicion about whether WFP is
eﬀectuating its purpose. North Korean refugees from the WFP’s target locations report that they never
received any aid.206 Others report that aid is sold to the market, permitting resale of these donations at
inﬂated prices. Still others reports state that as much as 90% of aid is diverted to the military (10%) and
government oﬃcials (80%).207 These reports are further corroborated by objective pieces of evidence, such
202Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 10.
203Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 225.
204Of course, problems with relief assistance are predictable, whether the recipient of aid is North Korea or not. Because
food distribution requires “a high degree of organization and management,” there are a number of administrative problems
that arise. Delays with distribution and shortage of rations are not uncommon in any relief eﬀort. See Helen Young, Food
Scarcity and Famine: Assessment and Response 56-58 (Oxfam Practical Health Guide No. 7, 1992).
205Terry, supra note 114.
206Id.
207Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 225 (citing N. Korea Refugees Insecure in China, Wash. Post, Apr. 9, 2000, at B6).
40as the North Korean submarine found in South Korean waters possessing foods packaged with international
donor labels.208
The divergence between distribution plans and distribution results is primarily attributable to organizations’
inability to properly monitor relief eﬀorts. To make sure the food is en route to the intended beneﬁciary,
agencies are permitted “spot checks” at any point.209 But once the food is dropped oﬀ, the North Korean
government cuts oﬀ organizations like the WFP, entrusting its PDS with subsequent allocation and distri-
bution. Of course, this means that even if the government passed all of the random spot checks conducted
by the agencies, it could still circumvent donor plans by withholding and/or diverting relief at the actual
distribution sites.210 Other strict rules governing monitoring procedures makes information about beneﬁ-
ciary receipt limited and often unavailable. For example, aid agencies must provide at least one-week notice
for any visits to sites, and unannounced visits to homes or schools are prohibited. A government translator
also accompanies monitors throughout their visit and translate at their discretion.211 In short, all of these
hurdles means there is no way of knowing whether the food that is provided is actually reaching the intended
beneﬁciaries.212 Because research suggests that food distribution, even food received as part of a relief eﬀort,
is contingent upon a citizen’s perceived loyalty to the government,213 there is deﬁnite reason to question
whether relief is being distributed according to the donors’ intentions.
This lack of monitoring further prevents donor organizations from determining appropriate timelines as well
as the amounts necessary for adequate relief. Without having accurate agricultural production information,
for example, donors may not know whether aid should be increased or decreased for a particular time period.
208Id.
209Lautze, supra note 18, at *8.
210See id.
211Terry, supra note 114.
212Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 7.
213Id. at 9.
41This is generally the problem of “additionality,” that is, the issue of whether food relief is being provided
“over and above what others of similar status living elsewhere are receiving.”214 If North Korea is actually
receiving a quantum of aid that is at or above the amount of food distributed through its public distribution
system, then – apart from humanitarian incentives – the government may choose to hoard or divert extra
resources.215 This type of economic diversion may actually be more prevalent than the usual idea of diver-
sion to military or government oﬃcials.216 Along with diverting resources, North Korea may also be using
international aid as “balance-of-payments” support – in other words, “allocat[ing] the savings in commercial
imports to other priorities, including military ones and luxury imports for the elite.”217 Indeed, it is hard
to justify North Korea’s expenditures during a time of professed need. For example, in 1999, North Korea
reduced commercial grain imports to less than 200,000 metric tons, but in the same year, it purchased forty
MiG-21 ﬁghters and eight military helicopters from Kazakhstan.218
In sum, lack of monitoring ultimately puts more discretion into the hands of the North Korean government,
which has yet to temper suspicions about whether it can be trusted to implement its donors’ intentions.
Information asymmetry therefore raises a number of concerns along diﬀerent points of the food relief eﬀort.
North Korea may permit spot checks, but it ultimately has discretion to assign the ﬁnal distribution points,
and these areas do not necessarily have to be those regions that are most in need.219 Rather, the government
may very well designate areas over which it has substantial surveillance and control. This possibility is a
likely one, especially given that North Korea often prevents visitors and even food relief workers from entering
certain parts of the country. Presumably, these “oﬀ-limits” regions are those parts that are not “safe” for
214Lautze, supra note 18, at *8.
215Id.
216See Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 24.
217Id. at 16.
218Id.
219See Lautze, supra note 18, at *11.
42outsiders to witness.
2. North Korean Unwillingness to Change. – Relief organizations have attempted to change the
terms of aid but have been met with little success. For example, Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans
Frontieres) gave up their eﬀorts when they realized that the government was blatantly engineering situations
to their own beneﬁt. Healthy-looking children suddenly appeared when the organization raised concerns
about whether food was being properly allocated; then sickly-looking children appeared when the North
Korean government demanded a need for more food.220 Some refugees conﬁrmed these suspicions, as they
admitted to delivering food from military storage to nurseries prior to a UN visit and to inﬂicting further
damage to ﬂood-devastated areas prior to a UN inspection.221 Because of grave suspicions that North Korea
was distributing aid only according to government perceptions about a citizen’s loyalty and usefulness to the
government, MSF withdrew its operation.222
The above complications with monitoring and the Doctors Without Borders example all point to the broader
problem of North Korea’s secretiveness and unaccountability. The common suggestion in the literature
seems to be that North Korea wants the beneﬁts of food relief without giving up any of its controls. Thus,
even though international aid organizations and bilateral donors are the ones generously providing what
North Korea is requesting, the government itself remains unrelenting when it comes to the terms of relief
provision.223
220Terry, supra note 114.
221Id.
222Id.
223The fact that North Korea seems to have all the leverage in these aid provision relationships is diﬃcult to understand.
Common sense would dictate that the one in need would be more amenable to donors imposing certain conditions of relief. But
this type of asymmetry is exactly what makes the North Korean famine and its food relief eﬀorts so challenging. Presumably,
aid organizations are strongly motivated by their desire to provide relief for North Korean citizens who are innocent victims
of a dictatorial regime. Hence, this motivation must be suﬃciently compelling such that the apparent unfairness of the donor-
recipient relationship becomes secondary to the moral consideration.
43E. Eﬀectiveness of Relief Eﬀorts
The number of and the frequency with which criticisms are launched against the North Korea food relief
eﬀort are many and recurring. Whatever the validity of these arguments, the eﬀort has not been a complete
failure. The PDS, a substantial part of which had collapsed during the famine, has revived in part.224 It was
reported that the PDS was able to increase daily rations to 319 grams by September 2003 because of food
relief provisions and improved domestic production.225 The PDS is also now able to distribute 350 grams
of food per person per day – though this is still short of the 450 grams determined to be an individual’s
“absolute minimum caloric intake.”226
Furthermore, the WFP Assistance Executive Director Jean-Jacques Graisse reported after a visit to a North
Korean kindergarten that “the children look far better than they did two years ago when the food assistance
started,” commenting that “[t]he food was delivered and has produced positive results among children.”227
A survey in 2002 conducted by UNICEF, WFP, and the North Korean government revealed “considerable
improvement” in children’s nutrition levels. For example, in 1998, the ratio of underweight children was
60.6%, but by 2002, the ratio had dropped to just 20.1%.228 Chronic malnutrition (stunting) declined from
62% to 42% and acute malnutrition (wasting) also declined from 16% to 9% during the same period.229
Thus, it is not descriptively accurate to argue that food relief eﬀorts have been completely undermined by
the North Korean government. The sentiment underlying that argument, however, is the important point to
224Granted, some may not regard the reinstitution of the PDS to be an improvement since this government-run distribution
system allocates food according to subjective and unpredictable criteria. But the point remains that there is an overall increase
in available supplies.
225Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 9.
226Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 20. There are several studies that discuss methods of quantitatively measuring
hunger. See, e.g., DeRose, Messer & Millman, supra note 2, at 20-49.
227Martin, supra note 17, at 553 (internal quotation marks omitted).
228Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 25 (citing Central Bureau of Statistics, Report on the DPRK Nutrition Assess-
ment (Nov. 2002)).
229Id. at 36.
44remember as the discussion now turns to policy recommendations. Critics of continuing North Korean food
relief rightly recognize that food relief is not as eﬃcacious as it could be, especially given the generosity of
donations over the past ten years. It is true that food is being wasted since relief eﬀorts are not reaching
the most needy populations, and at the same time, these unmonitored distributions may be perpetuating
the very problems infecting current relief eﬀorts. The larger question is, what ought to be done given these
circumstances? The ﬁnal Part attempts to tackle this consideration.
IV. Policy Prescriptions
The worst of the famine has certainly passed. North Korea, however, is by no means fully recovered nor
is it entirely immune from a reoccurrence of such a crisis. According to the FAO categorization of food
deprivation groups, North Korea is still a “group ﬁve” member, meaning it is among the group of countries
with the “highest and greatest depth of hunger.”230 Some NGOs report that North Korea’s “chronic food
emergency” has already extended into this decade231 and that much of the improvement is only attributable
to the generous food aid donated by the international community.232 And in its 2005 report, Amnesty
International concluded that North Korea “continued to fail in its duty to uphold and protect the right
to food, exacerbating the eﬀects of the long-standing food crisis.”233 Hunger and chronic malnutrition
therefore continue to plague children and urban residents who depend on the increasingly insuﬃcient public
distribution of food rations – they are thereby forced to spend up to 85% of their income on food sold on
private markets for 10 to 15 times the amount charged by the government.234
230Lee, supra note 119, at 1037. The FAO determines categorizations based on the prevalence and depth of hunger in the
country.
231See, e.g., Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 9.
232Id.
233Amnesty Int’l, Report 2005: North Korea, http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/prk-summary-eng (last visited Feb.
16, 2006).
234See id.; see also Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 10.
45With North Korea’s severe food shortages continuing, there are inevitable policy choices that must be made
by North Korea, its diplomatic partners, and humanitarian organizations. With the beneﬁt of hindsight, it
is useful to examine the relief eﬀorts initiated in response to the 1995-98 famine in order to construct an
eﬀective response for similar future crises. With the consequences and vestiges of the famine still being felt,
a reconsideration of the terms of food relief becomes a timely topic.
The discussion in Part III makes clear that the issue is not merely an absolute lack of resources. To a large
extent, the perpetuation of food shortages in North Korea is a deliberate, political choice. Given this, what
is the proper response? This question, though it necessarily involves a myriad of issues and is not satisﬁed
by a simple answer, carries some urgency. In August 2005, North Korea requested the United Nations to
halt food aid.235 This abrupt request for the WFP as well as other NGOs to abandon their relief eﬀorts
followed the European Union’s criticism of North Korea’s deplorable human rights record.236 North Korea,
however, insisted that its agricultural productions had suﬃciently increased to free it from over the decade of
assistance it had been receiving.237 The WFP’s December withdrawal from the country included the closing
of ﬁve regional oﬃces outside Pyongyang and 19 food factories.238 The withdrawal also drew heavy criticism
from the international community. The United States, for example, remarked that lack of WFP presence in
North Korea would hamper any eﬀective monitoring of food distribution.239 Others speculated that North
Korea was making a pure political move, in the hopes of regaining control over its public distribution sys-
tem.240
Then in December 2005, North Korea asked the World Food Program, which had been distributing food for
235Voice of America News, U.S. Criticizes North Korea for Halting UN Food Aid, Dec. 29, 2005,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-12/2005-12-29-voa56.cfm?CFID=
45345611&CFTOKEN=43113923.
236News from Russia, World Food Program Resumes Suspended North Korea Aid, Jan. 13, 2006,
http://newsfromrussia.com/world/2006/01/13/71111.html.
237See id.
238Id.; Digital Chosun Ilbo, WFP Halts Food Aid to North Korea, Jan. 8, 2006,
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200601/200601080002.html.
239Voice of America News, supra note 235.
240Digital Chosun Ilbo, supra note 238.
46about 6 million of its people, to amend its relief eﬀorts from food to development.241 And the WFP subse-
quently announced its intention to resume suspended assistance under a new plan of economic development
assistance along with food relief for about 3 million North Koreans.242 Doubts surround the new program,
with some aid workers noting that implementation might be too hurried to be eﬀective.243 There are also
concerns with whether the United States can continue to legally support a “development” project since the
country is only permitted to provide “emergency humanitarian aid” to North Korea.244
Given the recent suspension and resumption of WFP aid, what is the appropriate policy response? Admit-
tedly, the question presupposes the shortcomings of past eﬀorts, but the question remains why North Korea
still depends so heavily on foreign aid even after a decade of generous donations? These practical and legal
issues are important, but there is a broader consideration at the threshold that must be resolved prior to
oﬀering any recommendations: should aid be given at all to North Korea?
A. Should Relief Be Provided?
The answer to whether famine relief ought to be provided to North Korea appears to be a simple one, at
least if the issue is solely conceived in normative terms. But there are actually strong sentiments on both
sides of the issue. If the question were reframed at a higher level of generality, there are few, if any, who
would reject the basic argument that victims of famine ought to be provided relief. But the North Korean
famine presents a unique set of considerations that complicate an otherwise “simple” matter.
241News From Russia, supra note 236.
242See, e.g., id.
243See id.
244Id. WFP spokesman Gerald Bourke acknowledged this potential legal barrier and remarked that the eﬀort would be
oﬃcially called a “protracted relief and recovery operation” and that suﬃcient monitoring mechanisms might enable the United
States to continue giving aid to North Korea under the new program. Id.
471. Halt All Relief. – On its face, opponents of continuing aid appear severe, even unsympathetic to
the plight of North Koreans who are largely innocent victims of North Korea’s faminogenic policies. But
these critics do not challenge the view that relief eﬀorts could alleviate North Korea’s seemingly perpetual
problem with food shortages. Rather, they question whether relief, as a matter of fact, is doing so. In short,
they argue that continuing food relief provisions to a secretive, uncooperative country merely “feed[s] the
dictator” and “props up Kim Jong Il’s grotesque regime.”245 They observe that
[r]ural tractors have abandoned tractors and reverted to ploughing by hand or with
livestock. Mercedes Benz belonging to the ruling elite ply the streets of the capital,
while ordinary citizens dig for roots and edible plants in the grass strips lining the
ﬁve-lane boulevards. The public distribution system on which three-quarters of
the population depend for food, only provides rations on important dates, like the
birthdays of Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il.246
Other intra-country perspectives oﬀer further evidence for these critics’ accusations. For instance, they
point to the country’s signiﬁcant military budget as evidence of North Korea’s economic capacity – or at
least, as proof that the country is not so ﬁscally incapacitated that it absolutely needs external assistance
in order to survive. It North Korea wanted, it could simply reallocate its existing budget so that more
resources are poured into alleviating food shortages. Indeed, it is diﬃcult to resolve the fact that North
Korea somehow managed to maintain a 1.1 million man defense force247 while approximately ﬁve percent
of its total population died from famine. It also seems problematic to support continuation of aid in light
of North Korea’s recent expenditures. With Kim Jong Il purchasing approximately $5.2 million worth of
weapons from Russia in the summer of 2001,248 why should North Korea continue to receive aid, especially
if the same aid could be reallocated to a poorer yet more ﬁscally responsible government?
245Terry, supra note 114.
247Terry, supra note 114.
248Id.
48These critics emphasize the disturbing reality that, in spite of food relief, perverse disparities remain be-
tween the political favored and disfavored. In fact, they go further to argue that the provision of food relief
actually perpetuates these conditions because continuation of aid actually legitimizes the North Korean gov-
ernment.249 As a former aid worker argued, “The purpose of humanitarian aid is to save lives. By channeling
it through the regime responsible for the suﬀering, it has become part of the system of oppression.”250 Thus,
according to this side of the debate, continuing aid enables the North Korean government, which is the real
root of the food shortages problem, to remain in power.
249See, e.g., Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 7 (“In connection with the North Korean tragedy, we have therefore to
pose the question whether through giving humanitarian aid we are at the same time reinforcing perhaps the worst political
regime on the planet, a regime prepared to reinforce its power in the most drastic of means.”).
250Terry, supra note 114.
492. “A Hungry Child Knows No Politics.” – Commentators on
this side of the debate acknowledge the deep political concerns
underlying foreign governments’ decisions to halt aid, to make aid
contingent on compliance, or to impose sanctions. But they empha-
size the immediate consequences of such political decisionmaking,
namely the loss of “hundreds of thousands of lives.”251 Given the
extent of human suﬀering caused by food shortages, proponents
of continuing aid argue that the most normatively appealing pol-
icy response is to meet the demand. In short, the argument is that
“political and strategic considerations [should be put] aside in favor
of the moral obligation to feed the hungry.”252 This view presum-
ably accepts the fact that food aid to a government such as North
Korea will be imperfect.253
* * *
In an ideal world, the solution would be to work towards both short- and long-term goals so that food relief
is provided while regime change is being implemented. The problem is that, in the context of North Korea,
the two answers at the ends of the spectrum are not perfectly reconcilable. While this paper acknowledges
the serious political implications of continuing aid to North Korea, it nonetheless argues that food relief
should continue because of overwhelming normative considerations. It is perhaps the better of two evils, but
it is at least the better alternative.
251Natsios, supra note 1, at x.
252Id.
253Cf. Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 10 (presenting, though later refuting, the argument that meeting economic needs
by acting on the “humanitarian impulse” to provide food aid, for example, “provides the foundation for subsequent political
development”).
50First of all, there is normative consensus between the two sides of the debate despite the seemingly polar
positions. Those who advocate discontinuing aid do not argue that North Korean citizens do not deserve
food relief. Rather, their discontent lies squarely with the government’s misappropriation of aid and its
rigid insistence on secrecy. These critics’ answer to the question is not a resolute “no” – more accurately,
it is “no, not under the present conditions of relief.” And those who advocate continuing relief are not in
any way disagreeing with the troubling import of the aforementioned implications. Continuing aid does not
necessarily mean that aid must be provided in the same manner in the future. Thus, it is fair to conclude
that neither side would disagree with the general proposition that North Koreans ought to beneﬁt from food
relief but that the method of distribution needs serious reform. Continuing aid leaves open the opportunity
to fulﬁll both these objectives; discontinuing aid closes that door.
Second, opponents of continuing aid depend upon a questionable casual argument. In simple economic
terms, this side makes the basic argument that the short-term losses (famine victims) are worth less than
the potential long-term gain (political change)254 because, in their view, realization of this long-term gain
will prevent many more future short-term losses. In other words, stopping aid creates a situation in which
North Korea is more likely to implement governmental changes, which in turn creates a more humanitarian
government that is more likely to prevent future famines and food shortages. This line of thinking is tenuous
since it is not merely the provision of international aid that is keeping the regime in power. Halting food
relief does not guarantee the collapse of Kim Jong Il’s dictatorship.255 The practical import of this position
may be that North Koreans continue to die from lack of food while the government maintains its present
form of operation.
254For the proponents, the opposite is true. The short-term losses are suﬃciently valuable that saving even some lives is worth
more than the possibility halting food relief in the hopes of motivating regime change. Furthermore, proponents of continuing
aid leave the possibility of regime change entirely out of its set of relevant considerations, suggesting it is morally improper to
insert political factors into the calculation.
255See Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 35 (“If the current regime was capable of surviving a devastating famine, it
is highly dubious to assume that coordinated, wholesale reductions in food aid will necessarily lead to improved conditions or
policy reform.”).
51Third, opponents of continuing aid rest on a morally unattractive premise. The argument that halting aid
might create regime change manifests a “questionable utilitarian logic” that the certain loss of innocent
human lives is tolerable in the face of uncertain protection of lives in the future.256 Norms within the inter-
national community run directly counter to this type of valuation.
The conclusion that food aid should continue is not the end of the matter. In fact, answering in the aﬃrma-
tive provokes a series of complicated pragmatic questions about how aid ought to be delivered: Who should
deliver aid? Should aid be contingent? How should compliance be enforced? These issues are complex in
and of themselves, but in the context of North Korea, they are even more provocative.
B.
How Should Relief Be Provided?
As expected, the literature on the recent Korean famine often provides a number of recommendations for
three general categories of actors: North Korea, donor governments, and international aid organizations.
While the recommendations from the various commentators are not entirely uniform, they do share similar
underlying messages. They also share similar deﬁciencies. This section provides recommendations in direct
response to the two main problems that infected past relief eﬀorts. The next section then oﬀers a series of
other relevant considerations that ought to shape policymaking.
1. A Starting Point: Acknowledge North Korea’s Political Reality. – Given the number of con-
siderations involved in constructing a sophisticated policy, an obvious and easy starting point is to address
the two problems with past relief eﬀorts, as discussed in section III.C. This section begins with the problem
256Id.
52of North Korea’s unwillingness to change, as that provides a framework from which to consider all other
policy recommendations. Balancing and reconciling the policy considerations is complicated enough; the
ethical, political, and legal issues are not only manifold but also intricately intertwined. But to do so in the
context of the North Korean government poses a formidable challenge. North Korea has been described as
a “hard” state, that is, a state that has “repeatedly shown a willingness to allow its population to suﬀer
extreme deprivation.”257 It is also suspected, and proven to an extent, that humanitarian aid is diverted
according to North Korea’s policy preferences; often, this entails feeding political friends, the social elite,
and the military.258 Any proposed prescriptions, whether aimed at the North Korean government itself or at
donor governments and international aid organizations, must ﬁrst take into account North Korean’s political
reality.
(a) Prescribing Change for the North Korean Government. – The recommendations aimed at the
North Korean government recognize that the cooperation of the state is incredibly important and instrumen-
tal to eﬀectuating meaningful food relief. But in spite of the normative appeal of these recommendations,
they are shortsighted – and very possibly, unrealistic. Broadly speaking, none of these recommendations
discuss feasibility or likelihood of implementation. Perhaps the topic is purposely ignored to avoid deterring
humanitarian organizations, but whatever the reason, its absence is a glaring weakness.
For example, the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea states that it is imperative for North
Korea to “[l]ift the manifold restrictions and impediments that it continues to place on the humanitarian
community and abide by the international agreement to which it is a signatory.”259 It is easy to agree with the
257Id.; see also Voice of America News, supra note 235 (reporting that it is “common practice for North Korea to ‘ignore the
needs of its people’ and ‘let them starve for inexplicable reasons”’) (quoting U.S. State Department spokesman Adam Ereli).
258See Lautze, supra note 18, at *4.
259Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 34-35.
53statement, but it is far from clear how and whether this could be assured. Moreover, the recommendation does
not give a reason why the North Korean government might agree to implement these changes. The reasons
from a humanitarian organization’s perspective are clear. If, for example, the North Korean government
permitted unlimited access to all parts of the country, food relief organizations can provide more accurate
assessments of need and establish more eﬀective monitoring schemes. But what would compel the government
itself to do this? The same regime that imposed “extreme deprivation on its people” remains in power
without internal contest. Despite ever-present criticisms, food relief is still available to the North Korean
government. Indeed, adopting such a recommendation may be adverse to North Korean interests, presuming
that it wants to keep its current form of government – a more likely presumption than any other alternative.
Taking the above example, permitting aid workers to explore previously unseen regions of North Korea
would probably introduce unnecessary complications for the government. The extent of the famine might
reinvigorate criticisms from other states regarding North Korea’s human rights record, for example.
(b) A General Note to Donor Governments and International Relief Organizations. – One
extreme line of recommendations that some international organizations advocate is the reform and eventual
overhaul of the North Korean government. Again, as with the recommendations directing North Korea
to comply with international norms, for example, these suggestions recognize that the government itself
needs change. They are correct to point out that North Korea’s food shortage problem involves not only
“production and capacity,” but also “distribution and entitlement.” And while the former may be amendable
through policy changes, the latter necessarily depends on “fundamental features of the political system.”260
Thus, for instance, relief eﬀorts must be cognizant – though not necessarily compliant with – the government’s
ﬁrm adherence to the juche ideology as the “ultimate paradigm” for any state activity.261
260Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
261Yoon, supra note 43, at 1291.
54Famine scholars often point to the fact that throughout all of history, there have been no famines in demo-
cratic countries. As explained by Amartya Sen, democracies make the government accountable to its citizens
so that when people express their outrage toward crises such as famines, the government responds. Moreover,
democracies also permit the press to publicize the crisis.262 These studies are interesting but the extent of
their relevance to North Korea ought to be tempered, as the “resiliency of the despotic leadership and their
extent of control over society” is often “grossly underestimated.”263 North Koreans have known no other
system than the one that presides over them at present.264 The possibility of severe food shortages moti-
vating a type of popular uprising is romantic at best.265 Visions for broad social and/or legal reform ought
to acknowledge that the North Korean regime is still very much in control, at least over its indoctrinated
populace.
It is true that constitutional change might be another avenue through which to implement these larger-scale
plans, but it must simultaneously be noted that amendments are accomplished in a very restrictive manner.
The idea of change must be accompanied by a compelling reason for change.266 For example, “[i]f an open-
door policy is the inevitable option that must be chosen to overcome the country’s current economic diﬃculty,
law will be one of the most important vehicles to win over foreigner’s trust in... North Korea’s system.”267
Given the realities of the current North Korean government, there must be suﬃcient self-interest at stake.
262Natsios, supra note 1, at 7.
263Lautze, supra note 18, at *6.
264This is not to say that Kim Jong Il’s reign is invincible to criticism. In fact, his leadership could be criticized in terms not
inconsistent with North Korean cultural ideology or political philosophy. In North Korean thinking, the ﬂoods of the mid-1990s
and the subsequent famine could also be regarded as “a sign of heaven’s disapproval of a lack of righteousness in [Kim Jong
Il’s] administration and a signal that it is time for a change.” Martin, supra note X, at 553.
265See Lautze, supra note 18, at *6-7.
266See Yoon, supra note 43, at 1305 (“They have tried to lessen the gap between law in the book and law in action.”). For a
brief history of the changes to the North Korean constitution since the ﬁrst text was developed in 1948, see id. at 1292-1304.
267Id. at 1305 (“Relevance of law in managing a society should be enhanced in North Korea to draw foreign attention and
entice economic cooperation.”).
55Thus, any policy prescription must be mindful of the dynamic political interests that must be accommodated.
For the same reasons mentioned above, North Korea is unlikely to initiate radical changes to its government
when the status quo favorably entrenches Kim Jong Il’s dominance over the country.
North Korea may very well collapse, as some scholars predict (or hope), but this possibility does not reﬂect
the current reality. These recommendations reﬂect speculative ideals, arguing for what should be done if the
North Korean government were not the type of government that it really is. At present, more energy ought
to be expended in devising the most feasible solution for North Korea as it presently exists.
2. Improve Monitoring Eﬀorts. – (a) The Value of Information Access and Dissemination. –
“After nearly a decade of relief eﬀorts, North Korean practices still fall well below international
norms with respect to transparency and non-discrimination in the distribution of humanitarian
relief.”268 The fact that some relief organizations have been given access to some of the more vulnerable
populations in North Korea is certainly a good starting point. But “[s]imple possession of information is
inadequate; it is the open exchange of information that alleviates famine.”269 Admittedly, the reason that
aid organizations are not sharing information is not for reasons of selﬁshness. Most likely, their continued
access to the same populations depends on their cooperation with the North Korean government. They do
not want to risk releasing privileged information for fear of losing access. Although this is a valid concern,
relief organizations must be reminded of the signiﬁcance of information exchange in the broader scheme of
relief aid.
“The role that the free exchange of information plays in preventing and alleviating famines and prompting
268Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 23.
269Lautze, supra note 18, at *11.
56eﬀective responses has been well-documented.”270 At the most basic level, information raises awareness
in the international community. Particularly with an isolationist state such as North Korea, information
provides an “in,” opening avenues for relief eﬀorts as well as a means for multilateral organizations and
states with bilateral diplomatic relationships with North Korea to intervene.271
Furthermore, information is necessary to uphold the two-pronged approach that most donors adopt when
providing food aid: (1) targeting vulnerable populations and (2) monitoring food deliveries.272 Direct relief
requires a range of aﬃrmative acts, from “procurement, purchase, transportation, storage, and distribution”
– all of which require “reliable information regarding the dimensions of the tasks involved.”273 Often, the
eﬀectiveness of these approaches is undermined by the North Korean government’s lack of transparency and
therefore “critical gaps” persist with respect to “the socio-economic, political and geographic distribution
of suﬀering.”274 Monitoring then is no more than a “leaky sieve” and targeting eﬀorts are rendered useless
without North Korean’s cooperation or frankness.275 Therefore, suspicions about diversion of food relief are
heightened – and there are reasons to remain dubious. In April 2004, when a devastating train accident
left citizens of Ryongchon, North Korea in need of food and medical aid, various international donors gave
generously to help the victims and the community recover. Yet when an employee from a Japanese NGO
visited Chongjin’s Sunam Market, he captured an unsettling conversation with a vendor on videotape:
270Id. at *2-3.
271Of course, the availability of information alone does not necessarily guarantee the involvement of the international com-
munity. There may be cross-cutting interests that discourage participation. For example, the United States probably chose to
dismiss information about the Chinese famine since such news came at the height of McCarthyism. See id. at *3.
272Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 11.
273Golkin, supra note 1, at 36. The need for information is very much a pragmatic need. In order to conduct an accurate and
thorough assessment of the famine-aﬀected region, there is a considerable amount of research that must be done across a broad
range of issues. For instance, information about mortality, morbidity, malnutrition, and continuing threats to health are just
some of the indicators that must be determined; and all of these factors demand more quantitative analysis than speculative
estimates. These assessments also require collecting and evaluating information from a number of diﬀerent sources, which makes
access to information as important as its availability. See Young, supra note 204, at 10-43 (providing a basic guideline for
NGOs or other food relief organizations on how to conduct assessments).
274Lautze, supra note 18, at *3.
275See Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 11-12.
57Vendor: Buy some rice.
Recorder: The quality of rice seems good.
Vendor: It is the rice from the recent aid.
Recorder: From where?
Vendor: From aid to Ry-
ongchon. I went all the way to Ryongchon to get this rice.
Recorder: Oh, that’s why it’s expensive.276
Perhaps a less obvious need for accurate information is its importance to the donee government, that is,
to North Korea. Although it may be diﬃcult to believe, there is some evidence that not all North Korean
oﬃcials are aware of the extent of food shortages. Visitors commented that oﬃcials who traveled with them
outside of Pyongyang were actually “caught oﬀ guard by the extent of malnutrition and hunger witnessed
in the countryside.”277 Such lack of information dissemination would not be unprecedented. Relatively new
research about the Ukrainian and Chinese famines report that neither Stalin nor Mao were cognizant of the
famine’s devastation, at least during the famine’s initial onset.278
The limitations of the above point are obvious. First of all, it was not merely the lack of information
that contributed to the famine or to its continuation. Stalin and Mao, once they became aware of the
problem, did not design or implement emergency relief eﬀorts; rather, they made intentional decisions not
to confront the problem for political and personal reasons.279 Second, access to information might have
negative consequences, especially in regimes that are tightly controlled by one dominant leader. Both Stalin
and Mao demoted or even went so far as to execute oﬃcials who questioned oﬃcial government policies.280
Third, information may have no practical eﬀect on the government. Regimes like North Korea might very
well be entirely callous toward accounts of human suﬀering.
277Lautze, supra note 18, at *2; see also id. at *11.
278Id. at *2.
279Id. In fact, both Stalin and Mao ensured that a “shadow of secrecy” covered their famine crises. Internal compliance was
assured through intense repression of dissidents, including the use of torture, executions, public humiliation, and exile. Id.
280Id.
58At the same time, there are beneﬁts – however marginal – to increasing levels of information available on an
internal level. Just as it may be true that North Korean oﬃcials are ambivalent toward the eﬀects of famine,
it may just as likely be true that an acute awareness of the extent of suﬀering endured by their own people
might provoke moral, if not, political consciences. A general conscience-raising may increase likelihood
of information “leaking” or for internal dissidence. Given that there are already those who question the
strength of Kim Jong Il’s leadership, at least relative to the force of control possessed by Stalin or Mao,281
internal factions may not face the same brutal forms of retributions. Or, because the demise of the North
Korean regime is considered by some to be “inevitable,” internal opposition and factions could very well
fast-forward its fall. Moreover, information places the onus of responsibility on the possessor of information
for disclaimed consequences.282 Oﬃcials could then be held politically responsible for public statements that
are later proven false. This would at least decrease the amount of leverage the North Korean government
currently possesses, providing donor states and international organizations an objective, veriﬁable reason
for conditioning relief on North Korean cooperation. It would also be a reason that the North Korean
government would have more diﬃculty discounting as unreasonable if they were publicly caught disaﬃrming
relevant information.
(b) Feasibility of Implementation. – If there were doubts about the value of information exchange, the
necessity of free exchange and dissemination ought to be clear by this point. The more diﬃcult issue is
whether this value can be eﬀectuated in North Korea. History conﬁrms an important point.283 In 1931-32,
about six to eight million people died as a result of a severe famine that swept across the Ukraine and parts
281See, e.g., id. at *1.
282Of course, the one who possesses information also possesses an additional degree of leverage when negotiating terms of food
relief. But the argument here looks forward to the consequences of a broken negotiation or a negotiation conducted under false
pretenses – a very likely possibility when dealing with the North Korean government.
283But see Arnold, supra note 2, at 2 (“The superﬁcial physical similarities between one famine and another, which are often
what strike casual observers most forcefully (as if all famine ‘victims’ were reduced to a single timeless anonymity of destitution
and mistery), are treated by man historians these days with great caution and are taken to conceal enormous and ineluctable
diﬀerences between once society or one age and another.”).
59of the former Soviet Union.284 Then in 1958-62, more than 30 million people died from famine in China.285
Both famines, apart from their devastating consequences, occurred in Communist countries under the rule
of ﬁerce leaders – Stalin and Mao, respectively. Because of the similarities, ranging from the governments’
control of everyday life to the centralization of agricultural and economic policies, these historical incidents
provide a relevant framework from which to understand the recent North Korean famine.286 The basic lesson
that emerges from the Ukrainian and Chinese famines is the importance of acknowledging the obstacles
Communist systems pose in opposition to humanitarian eﬀorts – namely, the lack of information access and
the “prioritized allocation of limited resources” according to a government-created hierarchy. This feature
of the North Korean’s political reality must inform all food relief strategies.287 Failure to incorporate these
considerations is likely to result in an unwise strategy that may impede and/or exacerbate existing conditions.
As the current situation stands, unfettered ﬂow and exchange of information is more an ideal than a realistic
possibility. But there may be ways of at least increasing the amount of information that is currently available.
For example, there are technical improvements such as modern inventory-management systems that can
“reduce the scope for diversion and assure donors that their contributions were used as intended.”288 There
are also longer-term prospects that depend on the successful implementation of the types of recommendations
listed below. For example, a vigorous push for expansion of human rights in North Korea could liberalize
the country’s perception of speech and press rights. The likelihood of realizing this goal therefore ultimately
depends on the prospect for larger-scale change in other aspects of the North Korean government.
C. Other Recommendations
284Lautze, supra note 18, at *1.
285Id.
286See id. (noting isolationism, internal political struggles, and precariousness of the military as other similarities among the
three countries).
287See id.
288Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 37.
601. Recommendations for Donor Governments. – (a) Admit the Danger of Politicizing Relief.
– North Korea’s insular and unaccountable system of distribution naturally causes concern. In a government
as notorious as North Korea’s, concerns are heightened into fears of corruption. Yet several countries still
provide generous amounts of aid. There are two obvious motivations underlying this willingness to give aid
even to a dictatorial regime such as North Korea. On the one hand is the moral impetus. Certainly, the role
of humanitarianism and a desire to “do good” should not be lightly cast aside. On the other hand, another
motivation, that may not be as philanthropic but just as compelling, is political considerations.289 Countries
such as the United States and South Korea have unhidden political stakes in maintaining a relationship with
North Korea. Indeed, the reason for famine aid might be partly explained as an eﬀort at stabilizing an
already unpredictable regime during its domestic crisis.290 In fact, the United States, Japan, and South
Korea expressly endorse a “soft-landing” policy, which uses food aid as a means of keeping dialogue open
and maintaining amiable relations.291 This line of thinking accords with a general truism: “History teaches
us that famine may threaten the survival of the people of a communist nation but it will not threaten the
dominant political regime.”292 Taking that statement as true, it becomes more understandable why food
relief to North Korean citizens may be viewed as appropriate by these donor governments despite the oft-
criticized nature of that government. There is a disconnect: Withholding food relief does not necessarily
punish North Korea as much as it directly aﬀects its citizens.
But there is also reason to suspect that such political uses of food aid are actually steps backward in the
289But see D’Souza, supra note 1, at 5 (admitting the politicization of aid but also purporting that “a late response can be
more likely attributed to lack of precise and usable information rather than purely to evidence of political manipulation).
290See Goodkind & West, supra note 98, at 219 (surmising that such fears of destabilization were probably misplaced).
291Terry, supra note 114.
292Lautze, supra note 18, at *12.
61larger eﬀort to relieve North Korea of its food shortage problem. For one, nongovernmental organizations
seeking to impose stricter monitoring mechanisms, for example, are undermined in their eﬀorts when foreign
governments directly contribute provisions of food for various political ends.293 North Korea has no reason
to comply with monitoring requests because it bears no risk losing relief. Thus, although each state’s eﬀort
to maintain friendly relations with North Korea may further its own interests, it may be doing so at the
cost of realizing greater changes within the government. The problems that other governments encounter in
their diplomatic relationships with North Korea are not too diﬀerent than the problems underlying food relief
eﬀorts. At bottom, both sets of problems go to the dictatorial, secretive nature of North Korean government.
This is an issue that cannot be remedied through piecemeal eﬀorts; it requires wholesale change. But this
wholesale change is not realizable if states continue to reinforce the existing government by complying with
one-sided demands. The potential threat that North Korean poses to the international community is not to
be undermined, but it seems reasonable that North Korea should not be permitted to dictate the terms of
these diplomatic relationships. The subsequent recommendations in this section are designed to restore the
balance in favor of donor governments.
(b) Channel Food Through the WFP. – The two largest bilateral donors, that is, those donors that do
not channel food through the WFP, are China and South Korea. Both governments provide concessional
sales or grants of food without conditioning relief on any grounds. South Korea, for example, continues to
commit a tremendous quantity of food (about 90% of total WFP appeals) without requiring food relief to go
to the most vulnerable populations. As previously mentioned, these unconditional grants create problems for
international aid organizations that are attempting to establish better monitoring mechanisms. When South
293See Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 7.
62Korea provides assistance without any contingencies, it directly hampers the ability of other organizations
to demand means of monitoring distribution.294 Permitting North Korea to preserve its multiple avenues of
relief simply increases its bargaining leverage.
However, it is not enough for NGOs and other food donors to reprimand states for using humanitarian
assistance as a foreign policy tool. Although the criticism may be descriptively accurate, it is perhaps an
ideal at present more than the reality.295 The question must focus instead on how to motivate states to
comply with more apolitical humanitarian organizations whose primary concern is relief rather than, for
example, extracting diplomatic concessions.
Accordingly, states ought to be reminded of the beneﬁts of channeling relief. First of all, donors ought to
coordinate their eﬀorts under trustworthy umbrella organizations in order to impose greater accountability
on the part of the North Korean government. When states channel their donations through nongovernmental
organizations such as the WFP, fewer political interests are likely to complicate relief eﬀorts. Admittedly,
this is not to propose that all NGOs are entirely apolitical but it is to say that their interests diﬀer from
those of states. NGOs such as the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea are independent
organizations, created solely for the purpose of researching issues such as food shortages. Its aim is singular.
It has no tradeoﬀs or concessions to make with the North Korean government. Granted, there are criticisms
of the humanitarian relief eﬀort as well, but in the end, “the sheer value realized by the access and presence
of UN agencies, donor observers, private foundations, and NGOs should not be underestimated.”296
Second, channeling relief subtracts political considerations from provision of aid relief and thereby ensures
294Id. at 12.
295See, e.g., Lautze, supra note 18, at *12 (“Fully understanding the political nature of this emergency is essential....”).
296Lautze, supra note 18, at *3.
63that North Korean citizens’ suﬀering is not only alleviated when their government appears cooperative to
the donor government. It is uncontroversial to purport that states often have and are motivated by political
interests even in the context of humanitarian relief. One example is the United States’s public statement
justifying an “inadequate humanitarian response”:
We do not favor the current economic system of North Korea, which is a communist
system, which has clearly failed the people.... [I]t is that system that has failed the
North Korean people and has led to the starvation and deprivation that millions
of North Koreans are now experiencing. So are we going to put into North Korea
billions of dollars of American or Western or Asian money... to subsidize a com-
munist economic system? No way.... We are not going to spend billions of dollars
of American money to prop up a decrepit, ancient oxymoron, which is communist
economics.297
Japan’s recent decision to halt food its aid to North Korea is also illustrative. In May 2004, Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi had pledged 250,000 tons of food aid to North Korea but decided later that year to
withdraw its promise.298 North Korea, in a seemingly cooperative move, had handed over the cremated
remains of one of Japan’s abductees, Megumi Yokoto.299 But when DNA analysis established that the
remains were not that of Yokoto, but of two unknown individuals, Japan’s relations with North Korea
unsurprisingly soured.300 In addition to suspending aid, Japan remarked that it would not participate in
the WFP’s new development program until North Korea demonstrated a “sincere attitude” regarding the
abduction.301
These examples illustrate the ﬂip-side of how politics can run against relief eﬀorts. Just as states may use
298Malaysian National News Agency (Bernama), Japan to Continue to Suspend Food Aid to North Korea, Jan. 30, 2006,
http://www.bernama.com/my/bernama/v3/news.php?id=178035. About half of the pledged amount had already been dis-
bursed by time of suspension. Id.
299Id. Yokota was abducted in 1997 at age 13. As for abductees that have not been repatriated, North Korea claimed that they




64concessional food grants in order to procure a better relationship with North Korea, it can use the same
grants to sanction the government. This tactic may make sense in political terms, but whether bargaining
with food relief is normatively desirable is arguable. Thus, channeling aid actually provides states with a
convenient method of appearing apolitical with respect to humanitarianism since they would still participate
in relief eﬀorts but be one step removed from the terms of delivery. Relatedly, this would at least compel
North Korea to consider relief on more favorable terms for international organizations. If diplomatic partners
are channeling relief, then North Korea has less of a reason – at least no reason it can publicly espouse – to
criticize these states for an unwillingness to cooperate. In fact, North Korea would look even more suspicious
if it demanded South Korea and the United States, for example, to provide relief directly to the government.
It would further conﬁrm suspicions that the government has reason to evade monitoring procedures.
(c) Demonstrate a Commitment to Human Rights. – Donor governments should attempt to take a
broader perspective on the issue of food relief, recognizing that the problem is not one-dimensional. The
beneﬁts of promoting human rights are explored more fully below, but there are ways for states to cooperate
with the international community’s eﬀorts. For example, it is well known that North Koreans escape not
merely because of food shortages but also due to the oppressive nature of the regime. Organizations such as
Amnesty International therefore urge China – where most North Koreans ﬂee – to provide asylum seekers
to a “fair, satisfactory” process and to refrain from returning refugees when it knows they may be subject
to human rights abuses upon repatriation.302
Adopting these type of policies or laws may be an attractive route for many governments to take. Firstly,
these measures are entirely within the sovereign domain of each country. Secondly, although liberalizing
refugee laws may be viewed by the North Korean government as retributive, there are strong international
302Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 40-41.
65norms and human rights considerations that cut in the other direction. Also, it may be diﬃcult for the North
Korean government to publicly argue against laws that oﬀer protection for citizens claiming persecution or
starvation.
(d) Recognize State Sovereignty and Focus on Issues of Compli-
ance. – In any discussion of international law, a dominant, recur-
ring issue is that of state sovereignty. Whether humanitarian aid,
for example, is desirable as a normative matter does not resolve
whether that aid can be distributed or received. Common sense
suggests that a destitute country should willingly – and perhaps
gratefully – accept such foreign aid. But of course, the political,
diplomatic, and cultural dynamics at work make aid distribution a
more complicated matter.
Naturally, broader questions about state sovereignty arise. What is the role of foreign governments in hu-
manitarian crises?303 To what extent should a state become involved in internal, domestic aﬀairs? Even
if extensive involvement is possible, what is the likelihood of enforceability? These are many of the same
considerations surrounding international human rights law. Instruments such as the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICE-
SCR) explicitly contain provisions in support of an individual’s right to food and freedom from hunger.304
In fact, international conventions such as the 1996 World Food Summit reaﬃrmed “the right of everyone
303Professor and Father Francis Winters argues for the adoption of “political morality,” which requires “universaliz[ation of]...
the rights that one demands for oneself.” Under his theory, any rights that a country insists on for its own citizenry becomes
obligated to grant the same right to citizens of other countries that “do not disqualify themselves as partners in the international
political system by unjust or expansionist policies.” Byron, supra note 2, at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Francis X. Winters, Politics and Ethics 95 (1975)).
304See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976) (providing “the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger”).
66to have access to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental
right of everyone to be free of hunger.”305 More than 185 countries, including North Korea, subscribed to
such statements.306
While the expressive value of such statements is not to be undermined, the extent to which public en-
dorsements ought to be valued should be kept in mind. Perhaps reaﬃrmations of normative commitments
actually hinder prospective action. Because such statements partially relieve institutional – and in this case,
international – inertia, they may be given more weight than they perhaps deserve. In short, it is easier to say
what the problem is than to do something about it. Reemphasizing commitments may also get countries “oﬀ
the hook”, at least temporarily. The North Korean food shortage problem is concededly an involved issue
that lacks a simple, one-time solution; making statements of commitment provides a visible signal without
compelling action. If essentially no one has been able to resolve the problem, then there is little incentive
for one group or government to pressure others to follow suit, especially when doing so involves resources
that are necessarily being detracted from more pressing issues that may have simpler solutions.
3. Recommendations for International Aid Organizations. – (a) Understand the Nature of
the Current Food Shortage. – As a preliminary and practical matter, it is important for international aid
organizations to stay abreast of changes in North Korea’s need for food relief in order to appropriately tailor
their eﬀorts. When the North Korean government failed to meet the severe demand for food through its
public distribution system, its socialist economy was largely displaced by a “bottom-up marketization.”307
Despite formal criminalization of acts such as traveling in search of food and trading, the government failed
to entirely suppress these means of survival during the famine. As a result, the current food shortages “bear
closer resemblance to food emergencies in market and transition economies, where access to food is deter-
305Rome Declaration on World Food Security, Nov. 1996, available at http://www.healthydocuments.info/nutrition/doc32.html.
306Haggard & Noland, supra note 15, at 9.
307Id. at 11.
67mined by one’s capacity to command resources in the marketplace.”308 This means that currently, foods
shortages are primarily aﬀecting the underemployed and unemployed working class.309 Policy prescriptions
must take appropriate note of the changed nature of the food shortage.
(b) Establish Basic Norms. – “The desire to articulate clear norms among the humanitarian community
is not simply an exercise in idealism; it is also designed to solve a particular set of incentive problems that
can emerge in any humanitarian operation.”310 Setting forth clear norms enables international aid organi-
zations to construct strategies that are consistent with those goals and to better anticipate situations that
may require them to either amend or abandon their eﬀorts. Clarifying these basic issues at the threshold
prevents the organization’s theory of relief from being muddied by impulsive decisionmaking.
For example, in the case of the WFP, the agency has decided that one of its primary purposes is to allocate
distributions on the basis of need; the most vulnerable populations, regardless of age, sex, social status,
ethnicity, or any other classiﬁcation are to be targeted ﬁrst. Having established this as its priority, the WFP
can then move forward with designing monitoring procedures that make sure that the needy are being fed.
When it suspects that its goals are being averted, the WFP can then reconsider its distribution strategy to
ensure compliance with their own norms. In essence, norms provide a framework for relief and they also
impose a check on existing eﬀorts.
Thus, if some food relief organizations establish the same type of norm as the WFP with respect to reaching
the most needy populations, but they are not able to garner the relatively “broad” access that the WFP has
been able to secure, then they ought to reconsider their participation in the food relief eﬀort. It may be a
sad reality that, despite their willingness, not all groups may have the capacity to carry on a meaningful food
relief eﬀort in North Korea. Humanitarianism must confront logistical limitations. At the same time, “[t]heir




68would be more supportive of their mission.”311
Each organization that decides to involve itself in providing aid for the North Korean food shortage must
carefully think through its objectives. In addition to the terms of monitoring, organizations may want to
consider more speciﬁc conditions under which aid ought to be distributed. For example, whether aid should
be extended if access to that region is denied, or how compliance ought to be measured so that interna-
tional organizations are actually negotiating terms rather than readily complying with all of North Korea’s
requests. Resolving these types of issues from the beginning will better focus the organizations’ eﬀorts.
(c) Promote Human Rights. – The problem of food shortage in North Korea is not a problem that is
independent of the government. The fact that the government may have kept secret its crisis for political
reasons, or that it may be physically or economically diverting food at the expense of its citizens all indi-
cate the lack of respect for basic human rights in North Korea. Without some transformation in the basic
thinking of the government – whether it is motivated by economic, humanitarian, or pragmatic concerns –
food shortages may very well continue to plague the country. Therefore, the need to promote human rights
should not be considered as merely aspirational, but as a necessary precondition to securing North Koreans’
right to food.
The relationship between human rights and the right to food is indeed symbiotic. Human rights, whether
they are conferred or not, cannot be enjoyed without the right to food; and the right to food, without human
rights, becomes no more than a survival mechanism.312 Moreover, denials of certain rights, such as the North
Korean’s criminal prohibitions on the freedom of movement directly impede citizens from exercising basic
survival mechanisms. In North Korea, travel certiﬁcates take up to 15 days to process and are issued on
narrow grounds: Visitation of relatives is permitted though certiﬁcates rarely issue for this purpose; marriage
311Id. at 38.
312See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 1 (“Human rights are universal, interdependent and indivisible.”).
69or funerals of close relatives are permitted and more frequently recognized.313 The eﬀect of these procedures
kept most citizens conﬁned to their home regions, deterring migration in search of food during the famine.
The ironic consequence of this prohibition was that those citizens who remained loyal to the government by
complying with movement restrictions died in their hometowns while those who rebelled by illegally scav-
enging for food managed to survive.314 Denial of other rights, such as the freedom of expression and the
press, prevented accurate dissemination of information crucial to eﬀorts aimed at relieving the consequences
of famine.315 From the perspective of donor organizations, this lack of information regarding actual need
hindered eﬀorts to target the most vulnerable populations. From the perspective of North Korean citizens,
the dearth of available information not only suppressed political dissidents but precluded them from knowing
what was going on within their own country.
Having established the reasons motivating this recommendation, it is again important to consider the issue
of implementation. North Korea is presently a state party to numerous international human rights treaties,
including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).316 All of these
instruments speak of an individual’s right to food.317 Notably, the ICESCR provides that state parties must
313Id. at 15. If an individual cites a relative’s funeral as the reason for seeking a travel certiﬁcate, he must also provide
documents verifying the fact of death. Id.
314Id. at 16.
315Amartya Sen goes so far as to argue that “uncensored and active news reporting helps to prevent famines.” Id. at 20
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Larry Kilman, Free Press...A Nation’s Health Indicator, The Hindu, May 3, 2003);
see also Article 19, supra note 1, at 3.
316amnesty int’l, supra note 5, at 2.
317Article 6 of the ICCPR provides for “the right to life”, which must be protected by state parties taking active measures “to
reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.”
Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Oﬃce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.4
(2000)). Article 27(1) of the CRC provides that every child has a right to a standard of living that guarantees adequate
physical, mental, spiritual, moral, and social development; to that end, under Article 24(2)(c) and 27(3), state parties are
70“take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of [the right to food].”318 In a subsequent clariﬁcation
of what satisﬁes this obligation, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights squarely rejected
deﬁning the right to food narrowly (e.g., as a certain amount of caloric intake) and held that “[t]he right
to adequate food is realized when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with orders, has
physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement.”319 Technically
then, North Korea has an international obligation to abide by the terms of these instruments, some of which
provide more expansive rights than the North Korean Constitution.320
Of course, the reality is that North Korea has not fulﬁlled these international obligations and many critics
would also argue that North Korea is not even working towards these obligations. If organizations are serious
about relieving North Koreans from the oppressive reign of Kim Jong Il, then they must aggressively seek
methods of promoting and enforcing human rights norms within the country. This initiative may include
raising awareness in the international community as well as designing methods of permeating the North
Korean’s paternalistic embrace of its citizenry. The fact the North Korea responded to the European Union’s
criticisms of its human rights record by asking the WFP to withdraw provides at least some circumstantial
evidence that the government is sensitive to external feedback. This may be because the government fears
that such information might be communicated to its “oblivious” citizens and/or because such comments
undermine the pervasive control North Korea possesses over all aspects of its society. Whatever the reason,
NGOs and other segments of the international community ought to devote substantial resources and energies
into the human rights initiative. Although these eﬀorts may take longer to realize, they oﬀer the beneﬁt of
long-term, deep-rooted change.
expected, inter alia, to combat diseases, malnutrition, and provide material assistance. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 5.
Article 14 of CEDAW provides that state parties must “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women
in rural areas” in areas such as health care (Article 12) as well as economic and social life (Article 13). Id.
318Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ICESCR, supra note 303, art. 11.1).
319The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food considers this comment as “the existing authoritative interpreration of
the right to food.” Amnesty Int’l, supra note 5, at 4.
320For example, the North Korean Constitution does not confer economic, social, and cultural rights. Id.
713. Look to Development. – Relatedly, NGOs and UN agencies like the FAO should remember to maintain
a long-term perspective as to North Korea’s economic, social, and agricultural development. Several scholars
concur that that famine is preventable,321 but that “[f]amine prevention requires... long-range needs [to]
be addressed.”322 Development eﬀorts expand the focus from immediate relief to more chronic problems
such as poverty and malnutrition, which are the “most visible and dramatic aspect of hunger.”323 With
studies conﬁrming that a focus only on stopping starvation fails to restore victims both physically and
economically, there is a sense that more must be done.324 Practically, this means enlisting the help of
established organizations committed to development.
4. Stay Involved. – Lastly, the recommendation to “stay involved” is a motivational one. Several sectors
of society are able to participate on some level to alleviate the problems of North Korea’s food shortage. On
an individual level, the public ought to remember that they possess “enormous inﬂuence on [their] legislators
and other policy makers simply by asking them to adopt speciﬁc measures toward the prevention of hunger
and famine.”325
It is true that the North Korean problem presents a very challenging issue, but there is a great danger with
avoiding the diﬃcult issues simply because they are diﬃcult. As one author warns:
Western society is on the brink of collapse – not into crime, violence, or madness
or redeeming revolution, as many would believe – but into withdrawal. Withdrawal
from the whole system of values and obligations that has historically been the basis
of public, community and family life. Western societies are collapsing not from an
assault on their most cherished values, but from a voluntary, almost enthusiastic
abandonment of them by people who are learning to live private lives of an un-
precedented completeness with the aid of the momentum of a technology which is
evolving more and more into a pattern of socially atomizing appliances.326
321See D’Souza, supra note 1, at 5.
322Arthur Simon, Developing a Coordinated and Coherent U.S. Government Policy, in Famine (Kevin M. Cahill ed.), supra
note 2, at 152, 152.
323Id. at 153 (“Famine is only the tip of the iceberg.”).
324Golkin, supra note 1, at 47.
325Simon, supra note 322, at 159.
72It is important to keep a realistic, balanced understanding with respect to the proper methodology of relief
eﬀorts, but it is just as important to remember the ethical dimension of the North Korean famine. Both
donor governments and international aid organizations ought to recognize the potentially crucial roles they
possess in eﬀectuating change.
V. Conclusion
The North Korean famine is a unique phenomenon for more than one reason. As a general matter, famine
itself is an unusual occurrence.327 Although it may seem more “understandable” that famine erupts in
Communist regimes, famine is rare even in those societies. Apart from the Ukrainian famine during 1932-33,
which was deliberately imposed as a part of Stalinization, there have been no peacetime famines in rela-
tively advanced societies.328 Thus, the North Korean famine is properly characterized as “an exceptional...
event.”329
The famine might be even more “exceptional” because of the unique nature of the regime that currently
exercises power. North Korea remains a mysterious force in the international community, with much of
the commentary focusing on Kim Jong Il’s pervasive control over the society as a whole. Given what is
known and speculated about North Korea, it may no longer seem surprising that the government did indeed
create and perpetuate a famine. Whatever moral or political criticism may follow that proposition, the more
important focus may be on what the international community ought to do in response to the present reality.
327See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 2, at 6 (“Even in the most impoverished societies, famines are not everday occurrences....”);
Robert W. Kates & Sara Millman, On Ending Hunger: The Lessons of History, in Hunger in History: Food Shortage,
Poverty, and Deprivation 389, 404 (Lucile F. Newman et al. eds., 1990) (“[F]amine is already rarer and becoming even
rarer.”). But see Dennis G. Carlson, Famine in History: With A Comparison of Two Modern Ethiopian Disasters, Famine 5,
5-6 (Kevin M. Cahill ed., 1982) (stating that famines are “frequent” occurrences though admitting that they are less so in the
New World).
328Natsios, supra note 1, at 7.
329Arnold, supra note 2, at 6.
73As noted before, one can continue to hope for a radical change in leadership or even democratization – but
at the moment, these remain hopes rather than possibilities.
Indeed, it is frustrating to learn about such a devastating incident in North Korea for more than one
reason. First of all, a famine itself is an unfortunate crisis. Too many people die and suﬀer from the
simple lack of food. Given the adequacy of global food supplies and the theoretical capacity to feed the
hungry, famine emerges as an even harsher phenomenon. It has been almost half a century now since the
“threshold of theoretical food suﬃciency” has been met.330 As one commentator noted, “eﬀective... early-
warning systems, national and global emergency food reserves, and improved experience with distribution”
has brought the end of famine “well within sight.”331 Perhaps because of these realities, aspirational rhetoric
has abounded in the past several decades about the global ability to end hunger. For example, when Henry
Kissinger served as the U.S. Secretary of State, he stated during a multinational conference that, “In ten
years time no child will go to bed hungry.”332 Expressive commitments were soon matched with international
initiatives such as the Bellagio Declaration in 1989, which was promoted in an eﬀort to overcome hunger in
the 1990s.333 Despite all of this, the famines encountered in the past century have been “among the worst
in human history.”334
Secondly, famine in North Korea seems to present an insurmountable number of problems. The recommen-
dations pale in comparison to the gravity of the issue at hand. One is left wondering whether anything
330This threshold is an amount suﬃcient to provide a “near-vegetarian diet for all if distributed according to need.” Kates &
Millman, supra note 327, at 404.
331Id.
332Article 19, supra note 1, at 12.
333See DeRose, Messer & Millman, supra note 2, at 185-86.
334Harrison, supra note 330, at xiii.
74truly can be done in this situation. In all honesty, perhaps there is not that much we can do to improve the
situation in North Korea. But even if our eﬀorts prove imperfect, there are steps to be taken.
The recommendations above have been categorized under their respective headings for organizational pur-
poses, but policymakers must be cognizant of not only the multidimensional but also the interrelated nature
of the North Korean food shortage problem.335 A comprehensive policy must consider the merits and short-
comings of the proposed recommendations in tandem. The problem of food aid, as demonstrated above, is
not simply a matter of scarcity of resources. Rather, there are “many roots”336 and the various considerations
must be considered in conjunction with one another. Admittedly, it appears that not all of the recommen-
dations are neatly reconcilable. For example, some have argued that food aid takes precedence over human
rights concerns since the latter is “meaningless in the absence of the basic sustenance required to maintain
life itself.”337 But this is to treat two interrelated factors as mutually exclusive options: “a famine of this
magnitude could only have occurred in a system in which the political leadership was insulated from events
on the ground and lacking in accountability to the people.”338 In other words, guarantee of human rights
in North Korea may produce more honest, dependable distributions of food relief. Thus, those interested in
providing food aid must not possess a parochial vision of its relief eﬀorts. Rather, cooperative dynamism is
necessary among and across willing donors.339
In another sense, the North Korean famine is not so diﬀerent. The North Korean government is not the ﬁrst
to perpetuate famines “as a matter of policy or punishment as through ignorance or wilful [sic] neglect.”340
Unfortunately, history is replete with incidences of dictatorial leaders going to considerable lengths to en-
335See G. Ainsworth Harrison, Introduction, to Famine (G. Ainsworth Harrison ed.), supra note 1, at xiii (“[T]here are
numerous interlocking factors that produce famine....”); id. at xvi (“To deal with these co-operation at all levels, from research
and development to ﬁnancial and political aid, is needed.”).
336Haggard & Nolan, supra note 15, at 10.
337Id.
338Id.
339See DeRose, Messer & Millman, supra note 2, at 187 (emphasizing “the need for greater cooperation between the diﬀerent
sectors of society that potentially impact on food policy”).
340Arnold, supra note 2, at 97 (providing examples of other intentional famines).
75trench their own power. But that same history provokes a more hopeful possibility. At other points in
history, famine served as a signiﬁcant “historical marker[]” that inﬂuenced the future course of the coun-
try.341 This means that despite the devastation that often accompanies famine, famine also brings potential
for change. Because famine is a type of “collective catastrophe,” the incidence is remembered within the
“collective memory” of those who were aﬀected as well as those who simply observed its occurrence.342
The task, as simple as it sounds, is for the international community to remember the tragic crisis that befell
North Korea this past decade. The situation ought not to be recorded in scholarship for the sake of docu-
menting history, but it ought to provoke serious questions about the nature of the North Korean government
as well as the course of action that we ought to pursue given this knowledge. Famine brings to light deeper
issues that underlie our collective society. Food has always been “one of the principal sinews of power,”343
and an individual’s access to or denial of food is not merely about maintaining that person’s ability to live a
healthy life – it is at least about the pervasiveness that state power and legal rights possess over individual
lives. When we acknowledge that something can be done, though the steps may appear too incremental
for some, then it seems only right that something ought to be done. Although it may prove unsatisfactory,
perhaps all we can do at this present moment is to maintain vigilant awareness of the North Korean problem
in the hopes that, when the opportunity arises, we can construct a thoughtful and comprehensive plan to
eﬀectuate much more meaningful change.
341For example, Ireland’s “Great Hunger” in the 1840s is described as a “major watershed in the history of Ireland and the
Irish people [because it] ‘completely altered the course of Irish history, left an indelible mark on the mentality, attitudes, and
beliefs of the Irish, and made Ireland into a demographic anomaly which singles it out as sui generis in modern European
history.”’ Id. at 11 (quoting Joel Mokyr, Why Ireland Starved: A Quantitative and Analytical History of the Irish
Economy, 1800-1850 (1983)).
342See id. at 16.
343Id. at 3.
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